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ASYMPTOTIC GLOSTEN MILGROM EQUILIBRIUM
CHENG LI AND HAO XING
Abstract. This paper studies the Glosten Milgrom model whose risky asset value admits an
arbitrary discrete distribution. Contrast to existing results on insider’s models, the insider’s optimal
strategy in this model, if exists, is not of feedback type. Therefore a weak formulation of equilibrium
is proposed. In this weak formulation, the inconspicuous trade theorem still holds, but the optimality
for the insider’s strategy is not enforced. However, the insider can employ some feedback strategy
whose associated expected profit is close to the optimal value, when the order size is small. Moreover
this discrepancy converges to zero when the order size diminishes. The existence of such a weak
equilibrium is established, in which the insider’s strategy converges to the Kyle optimal strategy
when the order size goes to zero.
1. Introduction
In the theory of market microstructure, two models, due to Kyle [16] and Glosten and Milgrom
[13], are particularly influential. In the Kyle model, buy and sell orders are batched together by a
market maker, who sets a unique price at each auction date. In the Glosten Milgrom model, buy and
sell orders are executed by the market maker individually, hence bid and ask prices appear naturally.
In both models1, an informed agent (insider) trades to maximize her expected profit utilizing her
private information on the asset fundamental value, while another group of noise traders trade
independently of the fundamental value. The cumulative demand of these noise traders is modeled
by a Brownian motion in Kyle model, cf. [2], and by the difference of two independent Poisson
processes, whose jump size is scaled by the order size, in the Glosten Milgrom model.
When the fundamental value, described by a random variable v˜, has an arbitrary continuous
distribution2, Back [2] establishes a unique equilibrium between the insider and the market maker.
Moreover, the cumulative demand process in the equilibrium connects elegantly to the theory of
filtration enlargement, cf. [18]. However much less is known about equilibrium in the Glosten
Milgrom model. Back and Baruch [3] consider a Bernoulli distributed v˜. In this case, the insider’s
optimal strategy is constructed in [10]. Equilibrium with general distribution of v˜, as Cho [11] puts
it, “will be a great challenge to consider”.
In this paper, we consider the Glosten Milgrom model whose risky asset value v˜ has a discrete
distribution:
(1.1) P(v˜ = vn) = pn, n = 1, · · · , N,
where N ∈ N∪{∞}, (vn)n=1,··· ,N is an increasing sequence and pn ∈ (0, 1) with
∑N
n=1 pn = 1. This
generalizes the setting in [3] where N = 2 is considered, i.e., v˜ has a Bernoulli distribution.
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1A profit maximizing informed agent is introduced in the Glosten Milgrom model in [3].
2Models with discrete distributed v˜ can be studied similarly as in [2].
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In models of insider trading, inconspicuous trade theorem is commonly observed, cf. e.g., [16],
[2], [4], [3], [8], and [9] for equilibria of Kyle type, and [10] for the Glosten Milgrom equilibrium with
Bernoulli distributed fundamental value. The inconspicuous trade theorem states, when the insider
is trading optimally in equilibrium, the cumulative net orders from both insider and noise traders
have the same distribution as the net orders from noise traders, i.e., the insider is able to hide
her trades among noise trades. As a consequence, this allows the market maker to set the trading
price only considering current cumulative noise trades. Moreover, in all aforementioned studies,
the insider’s optimal strategy is of feedback form, which only depends on the current cumulative
total order. This functional form is associated to optimizers of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)
equation for the insider’s optimization problem. However the situation is dramatically different in
the Glosten Milgrom model with N in (1.1) at least 3. Theorem 2.6 below shows that, given
aforementioned pricing mechanism, the insider’s optimal strategy, if exists, does not correspond to
optimizers of the HJB equation. This result roots in the difference between bid and ask prices in
the Glosten Milgrom model, which is contrast to the unique price in the Kyle model.
Therefore to establish equilibrium in these Glosten Milgrom models, we propose a weak formu-
lation of equilibrium in Definition 2.11, which is motivated by the convergence of Glosten Milgrom
equilibria to the Kyle equilibrium, as the order size diminishing and the trading intensities in-
creasing to infinity, cf. [3] and [10]. In this weak formulation, the insider still trades to enforce
the inconspicuous trading theorem, but the insider’s strategy may not be optimal. However, the
insider can employ some feedback strategy so that the loss to her expected profit (compared to the
optimal value) is small for small order size. Moreover this gap converges to zero when the order
size vanishes. We call this weak formulation asymptotic Glosten Milgrom equilibrium and establish
its existence in Theorem 2.12.
In the asymptotic Glosten Milgrom equilibrium, the insider’s strategy is constructed explicitly in
Section 5, using a similar construction as in [10]. Using this strategy, the insider trades towards a
middle level of an interval, driving the total demand process into this interval at the terminal date.
This bridge behavior is widely observed in the aforementioned studies on insider trading. On the
other hand, the insider’s strategy is of feedback form. Hence the insider can determine her trading
intensity only using the current cumulative total demand. Moreover, as order size diminishes, the
family of suboptimal strategies converge to the optimal strategy in Kyle model, cf. Theorem 2.13.
In such an asymptotic Glosten Milgrom equilibrium, the insider loses some expected profit. The
expression of this profit loss is quite interesting mathematically: it is the difference of two stochastic
integrals with respect to (scaled) Poisson occupation time. As the order size vanishes, both integrals
converge to the same stochastic integral with respect to Brownian local time, hence their difference
vanishes.
The paper is organized as follows. Main results are presented in Section 2. The mismatch between
insider’s optimal strategy and optimizers for the HJB equation is proved in Section 3. Then a family
of suboptimal strategies are characterized and constructed in Sections 4 and 5. Finally the existence
of asymptotic equilibrium is established in Section 6 and a technical result is proved in Appendix.
2. Main results
2.1. The model. We consider a continuous time market for a risky and a risk free asset. The
risk free interest rate is normalized to 0, i.e., the risk free asset is regarded as the nume´raire. We
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assume that the fundamental value of the risky asset v˜ has a discrete distribution of type (1.1).
This fundamental value will be revealed to all market participants at a finite time horizon, say 1,
at which point the market will terminate.
The micro-structure of the market and the interaction of market participants are modeled sim-
ilarly to [3] which we recall below. There are three types of agents: uninformed/noise traders, an
informed trader/insider, and a market maker, all of whom are risk neutral. These agents share the
same view toward future randomness of the market, but they possess different information. There-
fore, the probability space (Ω,P) with different filtration accommodates the following processes:
• Noise traders trade for liquidity or hedging reasons which are independent of the fundamen-
tal value v˜. The cumulative demand Z is described by the difference of two independent
jump processes ZB and ZS which are the cumulative buy and sell orders, respectively.
Therefore Z = ZB − ZS and it is independent of v˜. Noise traders only submit orders of
fixed sized δ every time they trade. As in [3], ZB/δ and ZS/δ are assumed to be independent
Poisson processes with constant intensity β. Let (FZt )t∈[0,1] be the smallest filtration gen-
erated by Z and satisfying the usual conditions. Then (FZt )t∈[0,1] describes the information
structure of noise traders.
• The insider knows the fundamental value v˜ at time 0 and observes the market price for
the risky asset between time 0 and 1. The insider also submits orders of fixed size δ in
every trade and tries to maximize her expected profit. The cumulative demand from the
insider is denoted by X := XB −XS where XB and XS are cumulative buy and sell orders
respectively. Since the insider observes the market price of the risky asset, she can back out
the dynamics of noise orders, cf. discussions after Definition 2.1. Therefore the information
structure of the insider FIt includes FZt and σ(v˜), for any t ∈ [0, 1].
• A competitive market maker only observes the aggregation of the informed and noise trades,
so he cannot distinguish between informed and noise trades. Given Y := X + Z, the
information of the market maker is (FYt )t∈[0,1] generated by Y and satisfying the usual
conditions. As the market maker is risk neutral, the competition will force him to set the
market price as E[v˜|FYt ], t ∈ [0, 1].
In order to define equilibrium in the market, let us first describe admissible actions for the market
maker and the insider. The market maker looks for a Markovian pricing mechanism, in which the
price of the risky asset at time t is set using cumulative order Yt and a pricing rule p.
Definition 2.1. A function p : δZ × [0, 1]→ R is a pricing rule if
i) y 7→ p(y, t) is strictly increasing for each t ∈ [0, 1);
ii) limy→−∞ p(y, t) = v1 and limy→∞ p(y, t) = vN for each t ∈ [0, 1];
iii) t 7→ p(y, t) is continuous for each y ∈ δZ.
The monotonicity of y 7→ p(y, t) in i) is natural. It implies that the market price is higher
whenever the demand is higher. Moreover, because of the monotonicity, the insider fully observes
the uninformed orders Z by inverting the price process and subtracting her orders from the total
orders. Item ii) means that the range of the pricing rule is wide enough to price in every possibility
of fundamental value.
The insider trades to maximize her expected profit. Her admissible strategy is defined as follows:
Definition 2.2. The strategy (XB ,XS ;FI) is admissible, if
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i) FI is a filtration satisfying the usual conditions and generated by σ(v˜), FZ , and H, where
(Ht)t∈[0,1] is a filtration independent of v˜ and FZ ;
ii) XB and XS , with XB0 = X
S
0 = 0, are FI -adapted and integrable3 increasing point processes
with jump size δ;
iii) the (FI ,P)-dual predictable projections of XB and XS are absolutely continuous with respect
to time, hence XB and XS admit FI−intensities θB and θS, respectively;
iv) E
[∫ 1
0 |p(Yt, t)| |dXit − δθitdt|
]
< ∞, for i ∈ {B,S} and the pricing rule p fixed by the market
maker. Here |Xi − ∫ ·0 δθidt| is the variation of the compensated point process.
This set of admissible strategies is similar to [10, Definition 2.2]. Item i) assumes that the
insider is allowed to possess additional information H, independent of v˜ and FZ , which she uses to
generate her mixed strategy. Item iv) implies δE[
∫ 1
0 |p(Yt, t)| θitdt] < ∞, hence the expected profit
of the insider is finite. Item ii) does not exclude the insider trading at the same time with noise
traders. When the insider submits an order at the same time when an uniformed order arrives
but in the opposite direction, assuming the market maker only observes the net demand implies
that such pair of trades goes unnoticed by the market maker. This pair of opposite orders will be
executed without a need for a market maker. Hence the market maker only knows the transaction
when there is a need for him. Henceforth, when the insider makes a trade at the same time with
an uninformed trader but in an opposite direction, we say the insider cancels the noise trades. On
the other hand, item ii) also allows the insider to trade at the same time with noise traders in the
same direction. We call that the insider tops up noise orders in this situation. However, the insider
does not submit such orders in equilibrium, even when equilibrium is defined in a weak sense, cf.
Remark 4.6 below. The assumption that the insider is allowed to trade at the same time as noise
traders is different from assumptions for Kyle model where insider’s strategy is predictable. This
additional freedom for insider is not the source for Theorem 2.6 below, which states optimizers for
the insider’s HJB equation do not correspond to the optimal strategy; see Remark 2.8 below.
As described in the last paragraph, the insider’s cumulative buy orders may consist of three
components: XB,B arrives at different time than those of ZB, XB,T arrives at the same time as
some orders of ZB , and XB,S cancels some orders of ZS . Sell orders XS are defined analogously.
Therefore XB = XB,B +XB,T +XB,S and XS = XS,S +XS,T +XS,B.
As mentioned earlier, the insider aims to maximize her expected profit. Given an admissible
trading strategy X = XB −XS the associated profit at time 1 of the insider is given by∫ 1
0
Xt−dp(Yt, t) + (v˜ − p(Y1, 1))X1.
The last term appears due to a potential discrepancy between the market price and the liquidation
value. Since X is of finite variation and X0 = 0, applying integration by parts rewrites the profit as∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt, t)) dXBt −
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt, t)) dXSt
=
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt− + δ, t)) dXB,Bt +
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt− + 2δ, t)) dXB,T +
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt−, t)) dXB,St
−
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt− − δ, t)) dXS,St −
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt− − 2δ, t)) dXS,T −
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt−, t)) dXS,Bt ,
3That is, E[XB1 ] and E[X
S
1 ] are both finite.
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where Y increases (resp. decreases) δ when XB,B (resp. XS,S) jumps by δ, Y increases (resp.
decreases) 2δ when XB,T (resp. XS,T ) jumps at the same time with ZB (resp. ZS), and Y is
unchanged when XS,B (resp. XB,S) jumps at the same time with ZB (resp. ZS). Define
a(y, t) := p(y + δ, t) and b(y, t) := p(y − δ, t),
which can be viewed as ask and bid prices respectively. Then the expected profit of the insider
conditional on her information can be expressed as
E
[∫ 1
0
(v˜ − a(Yt−, t)) dXB,Bt +
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − a(Yt− + δ, t)) dXB,Tt +
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt−, t)) dXB,St
−
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − b(Yt−, t)) dXS,St −
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − b(Yt− − δ, t)) dXS,Tt −
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt−, t)) dXS,Bt
∣∣∣v˜] .
(2.1)
Having described the market structure, an equilibrium between the market maker and the insider
is defined as in [3]:
Definition 2.3. A Glosten Milgrom equilibrium is a quadruplet (p,XB ,XS ,FI) such that
i) given (XB ,XS ;FI), p is a rational pricing rule, i.e., p(Yt, t) = E[v˜|FYt ] for t ∈ [0, 1];
ii) given p, (XB ,XS ;FI) is an admissible strategy maximizing (2.1).
When N = 2, [10] establishes the existence of Glosten Milgrom equilibria. In equilibrium the
pricing rule is
(2.2) p(y, t) = EP
y
[P (Z1−t)] , (y, t) ∈ δZ× [0, 1].
Here Py is a probability measure under which Z is the difference of two independent Poisson
processes and Py(Z0 = y) = 1. P is a nondecreasing function such that P (Z1) has the same
distribution as v˜. Moreover the optimal strategy of the insider are given by jump processes Xi,j , i ∈
{B,S} and j ∈ {B,T, S}, with intensities δ θi,j(Yt−, t), t ∈ [0, 1]. These intensities are deterministic
functions of the state variable Y , hence this control strategy is a feedback control and it corresponds
to optimizers of insider’s HJB equation. However, when N ≥ 3, Theorem 2.6 below shows that,
given the pricing rule (2.2), the optimal strategy does not correspond to optimizers in the HJB
equation, for some values of v˜. This result is surprising, because it is contrast to existing results in
the Kyle and Glosten Milgrom equilibrium; cf. [16], [2], [4], [3], [8], [9], and [10]. This mismatch
roots in the discrete state space of the demand process in the Glosten Milgrom model. The discrete
state space yields different bid and ask prices, which is contrast to the unique price in the Kyle
model. See Remark 2.7 below for more discussion.
2.2. Nonexistence of a feedback optimal control. To state aforementioned result, we introduce
several additional notations. For each δ > 0, let Ωδ = D([0, 1], δZ) be the space of δZ-valued ca`dla`g
functions on [0, 1] with coordinate process Zδ, (FZ,δt )t∈[0,1] is the minimal right continuous and
complete filtration generated by Zδ, and Pδ is the probability measure under which Zδ is the
difference of two independent Poisson processes starting from 0 with the same jump size δ and
intensity βδ. We denote by Pδ,y the probability measure under which Zδ0 = y a.s.. Henceforth, the
superscript δ indicates the trading size in the Glosten Milgrom model.
For the fundamental value v˜δ , let us first consider the following family of distributions.
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Assumption 2.4. Given v˜δ of type (1.1), there exists a δZ ∪ {−∞,∞}−valued strictly increasing
sequence (aδn)n=1,··· ,N+1
4 with aδ1 = −∞, aδN+1 =∞, and ∪Nn=1[aδn, aδn+1) = δZ ∪ {−∞}, such that
(2.3) P(v˜δ = vn) = P
δ
(
Zδ1 ∈ [aδn, aδn+1)
)
, n = 1, · · · , N.
For any v˜ with discrete distribution (1.1), Lemma 6.1 below shows there exists a sequence (v˜δ)δ>0,
each satisfies Assumption 2.4 and converges to v˜ in law as δ ↓ 0. Therefore any v˜ of type (1.1) can
be approximated by a v˜δ satisfying Assumption 2.4. Given v˜δ satisfying Assumption 2.4, define
(2.4) hδn(y, t) := P
δ,y
(
Zδ1−t ∈ [aδn, aδn+1)
)
, y ∈ δZ, t ∈ [0, 1], n ∈ {1, · · · , N},
and
(2.5) pδ(y, t) :=
N∑
n=1
vnh
δ
n(y, t) = E
δ,y
[
P (Zδ1−t)
]
,
where the expectation is taken under Pδ,y and
(2.6) P (y) = vn, when y ∈ [aδn, aδn+1).
Then (2.3) implies that v˜δ and P (Zδ1) have the same distribution. If p
δ is chosen as the pricing rule,
it has the same form as in (2.2). Finally we impose a technical condition on pδ. This assumption
is clearly satisfied when N is finite.
Assumption 2.5. There exist positive constants C and n such that |pδ(y, t)| ≤ C(1+ |y|n) for any
(y, t) ∈ δZ × [0, 1].
Given the pricing rule (2.5), let us first study the insider’s optimization problem and derive the
associated HJB equation via a heuristic argument. In this derivation, the superscript δ is omitted
to simplify notation. Definition 2.2 iii) implies that Xi,j − δ ∫ ·0 θi,jr dr defines an FI -martingale
for i ∈ {B,S} and j ∈ {B,T, S}. On the other hand, Definition 2.2 iv) and [7, Chapter I, T6]
combined imply that
∫ ·
0(v˜ − p(Yr− + δ, r))(dXB,Br − δθB,Br dr) =
∫ ·
0(v˜ − p(Yr, r))(dXB,Br − δθB,Br dr)
is an FI -martingale. Similar argument applied to other terms allows us to rewrite (2.1) as
δE
[ ∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yr− + δ, r))θB,Br dr +
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yr− + 2δ, r))θB,Tr dr +
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yr−, r))θB,Sr dr
−
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yr− − δ, r))θS,Sr dr −
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yr− − 2δ, r))θS,Tr dr −
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yr−, r))θS,Br dr
∣∣∣v˜].
This motivates us to define the following value function for the insider:
V δ(v˜, y, t) := sup
θi,j ; i∈{B,S},j∈{B,T,S}
δ E
[ ∫ 1
t
(v˜ − p(Yr− + δ, r))θB,Br dr +
∫ 1
t
(v˜ − p(Yr− + 2δ, r))θB,Tr dr +
∫ 1
t
(v˜ − p(Yr−, r))θB,Sr dr
−
∫ 1
t
(v˜ − p(Yr− − δ, r))θS,Sr dr −
∫ 1
t
(v˜ − p(Yr− − 2δ, r))θS,Tr dr −
∫ 1
t
(v˜ − p(Yr−, r))θS,Br dr
∣∣∣Yt = y, v˜],
(2.7)
4When N =∞, N + 1 =∞.
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for v˜ = {v1, · · · , vN}, y ∈ δZ, t ∈ [0, 1). The terminal value of V δ is defined as V δ(v˜, y, 1) =
limt→1 V δ(v˜, y, t) 5. Lemma 3.2 and Proposition 4.4 below show that the optimization problem
in (2.7) is well defined and nontrivial, i.e., 0 < V δ < ∞, for each δ > 0. Let us now derive the
HJB equation which V δ satisfies via a heuristic argument. Since positive (resp. negative) part
of Y is Y B := XB,B + XB,T + ZB − XS,B (resp. Y S := XS,S + XS,T + ZS − XB,S). Hence
Y B − δ ∫ ·0(β − θS,Br − θB,Tr ) dr − δ ∫ ·0 θB,Br dr − 2δ ∫ ·0 θB,Tr dr (resp. Y S − δ ∫ ·0(β − θB,Sr − θS,Tr ) dr −
δ
∫ ·
0 θ
S,S
r dr − 2δ
∫ t
0 θ
S,T
r dr) is an FI -martingale.6 Then applying Itoˆ’s formula to V δ(v˜, Yr, r) and
employing the standard dynamic programming arguments yield the following formal HJB equation
for V δ:
(2.8) − Vt(vn, y, t)−H(vn, y, t, V ) = 0, n ∈ {1, · · · , N}, (y, t) ∈ δZ × [0, 1),
where the Hamilton H is defined as (the v˜ argument is omitted in H to simplify notation)
H(vn, y, t, V ) :=(V (y + δ, t) − 2V (y, t) + V (y − δ, t))β
+ sup
θB,B≥0
[
V (y + δ, t) − V (y, t) + (vn − p(y + δ, t))δ
]
θB,B
+ sup
θB,T≥0
[
V (y + 2δ, t) − V (y + δ, t) + (vn − p(y + 2δ, t))δ
]
θB,T
+ sup
θB,S≥0
[
V (y, t)− V (y − δ, t) + (vn − p(y, t))δ
]
θB,S
+ sup
θS,S≥0
[
V (y − δ, t) − V (y, t)− (vn − p(y − δ, t))δ
]
θS,S
+ sup
θS,T≥0
[
V (y − 2δ, t) − V (y − δ, t) − (vn − p(y − 2δ, t))δ
]
θS,T
+ sup
θS,B≥0
[
V (y, t)− V (y + δ, t)− (vn − p(y, t))δ
]
θS,B.
(2.9)
Optimizers θi,j, i ∈ {B,S} and j ∈ {B,T, S}, in (2.9), are deterministic functions of vn, y and t,
hence they are of feedback form. They are expected to be the optimal control intensities for (2.7).
This is indeed the case in many existing results in Kyle model and Glosten Milgrom model (with
N = 2), compare [16], [2], [4], [3], and [10]. However, when N ≥ 3 in the Glosten Milgrom model,
the following theorem shows any optimizers in (2.9) are not the optimal intensities when v˜ is neither
v1 nor vN .
Theorem 2.6. Let N ≥ 3 and v˜δ satisfy Assumption 2.4. Let pδ in (2.5) be the pricing rule
and satisfy Assumption 2.5. Then any optimizers θi,j(y, t), i ∈ {B,S}, j ∈ {B,T, S} and (y, t) ∈
δZ × [0, 1), for (2.9) are not the optimal strategy for (2.7) when v˜δ = vn for 1 < n < N .
Remark 2.7. When v˜δ = v1 (resp. vN ), the insider knows the risky asset is always over-priced (resp.
under-priced). Hence she always sells (resp. buys) in equilibrium. This situation is exactly the
same as [10]. When v˜δ is neither minimal nor maximal, let us briefly describe the proof of Theorem
5Since the set of admissible control is unbounded, the HJB equation associated to (2.7) usually admits a boundary
layer, i.e., limt→1 V
δ(v˜, y, t) is not identically zero even if there is no terminal profit in (2.1). Such phenomenon also
shows up in Kyle model, see [2].
6As discussed after Definition 2.2, the set of jumps of XB,S and XS,T (resp. XS,B and XB,T ) arrive at the same
time as some jumps of ZS (resp. ZB), then we necessarily have θB,S + θS,T ≤ β (resp. θS,B + θB,T ≤ β).
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2.6 here. To ensure (2.8) to be wellposed, H must be finite for all (y, t) ∈ δZ × [0, 1). Hence
(2.10) (p(y, t) − vn)δ ≤ V (y + δ, t) − V (y, t) ≤ (p(y + δ, t)− vn)δ, for all (y, t) ∈ δZ × [0, 1),
where the second inequality comes from the first three maximization in (2.9) and the first inequality
comes from the last three. Since V > 0, θi,j ≡ 0, i ∈ {B,S} and j ∈ {B,T, S}, in (2.9) does not
correspond to the optimal strategy. Hence there must exist (y0, t0) such that one inequality in
(2.10), say the first one, is an equality. However, in this case, the discrete state space forces the
first inequality to be an equality for all (y, t) ∈ δZ × [0, 1), which implies the second inequality in
(2.10) is strict for all (y, t), due to p(y + δ, t) > p(y, t). Therefore the optimizers in the first three
maximization in (2.9) must be identically zero, which means the associated point process X does
not have positive jumps. On the other hand, the dynamic programming principle and the boundary
layer of (2.8) at t = 1 force Y1 = Z1+X1 ∈ [aδn+ δ, aδn+1] a.s.. This can never happen when X does
not have positive jumps. Therefore, Theorem 2.6 is the joint effort of the discrete state space and
the boundary layer of the HJB equation.
Remark 2.8. The statement of Theorem 2.6 remains valid when the insider is prohibited from
trading with noise traders at the same time; i.e., XB,T ,XB,S ,XS,T ,XS,B are all zero. In this case,
the second, third, fifth and sixth maximization do not present in (2.9). However, the first and fourth
maximization therein still lead to (2.10). Hence the same argument as in the previous remark still
applies.
Remark 2.9. Examples of control problems without optimal feedback control exist in literature of
the optimal control theory, cf., e.g. [21, Chapter 3, pp. 246] and [17, Example 1.1]. In these cases,
notion of relaxed control is employed to prove the existence of a relaxed optimal control, cf. [17]
and references therein. For the insider’s optimization problem, instead of {θ : δZ × [0, 1] → R+},
the control set can be relaxed to {θ : δZ × [0, 1] → M1(R+)}, where M1(R+) is the set of all
probability measures in R+. It is interesting to investigate whether (2.7) admits an optimal control
in this relaxed set. We leave this topic to future studies.
2.3. Asymptotic Glosten Milgrom equilibrium. To establish equilibrium of Glosten Milgrom
type when the risky asset v˜ has general discrete distribution (1.1) with N ≥ 3, we introduce a
weak form of equilibrium in what follows. To motivate this definition, we recall the convergence
of Glosten Milgrom equilibria as the order size decreasing to zero and intensity of noise trades
increasing to infinity, cf. [3, Theorem 3] and [10, Theorem 5.3]:
Proposition 2.10. For any Bernoulli distributed v˜ (i.e. N = 2 in (1.1)), there exists a sequence
of Bernoulli distributed random variables v˜δ such that
i) v˜δ converges to v˜ in law as δ ↓ 0;
ii) For each δ > 0, model with v˜δ as the fundamental value of the risky asset admits a Glosten
Milgrom equilibrium (pδ,XB,δ ,XS,δ,FI,δ);
iii) When the intensity of Poisson process is given by βδ := (2δ2)−1, XB,δ−XS,δ L−→ X0, as δ ↓ 0,
where X0 is the optimal strategy in the Kyle model and
L−→ represents the weak convergence
of stochastic processes7.
This result motivates us to define the following weak form of Glosten Milgrom equilibrium:
7Refer to [5] or [14] for the definition of weak convergence of stochastic processes.
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Definition 2.11. For any v˜ with discrete distribution (1.1), an asymptotic Glosten Milgrom equi-
librium is a sequence (v˜δ , pδ,XB,δ ,XS,δ,FI,δ)δ>0 such that
i) v˜δ converges to v˜ in law as δ ↓ 0;
ii) For each δ > 0, given (v˜δ,XB,δ ,XS,δ,FI,δ) and set Y δ := Zδ +XB,δ − XS,δ, pδ is a rational
pricing rule, i.e., pδ(Y δt , t) = E[v˜
δ | FY δt ] for t ∈ [0, 1];
iii) Given (v˜δ, pδ) and βδ = (2δ2)−1, let J δ(XB ,XS) be insider’s expected profit associated to the
admissible strategy (XB ,XS). Then
sup
(XB ,XS) admissible
J δ(XB ,XS)− J δ(XB,δ ,XS,δ)→ 0, as δ ↓ 0.
In the above definition, rationality of the pricing mechanism is not compromised. However
optimality of the insider’s strategy is not enforced. Instead, item iii) requires that, when the order
size is small, the loss of insider’s expected profit by employing the strategy (XB,δ ,XS,δ;Fδ,I) is
small, comparing to the optimal value. Moreover this discrepancy converges to zero when the order
size vanishes. Therefore if the insider is willing to give up a small amount of expected profit, she
can employ strategy (XB,δ ,XS,δ;FI,δ) to establish a suboptimal equilibrium. The following result
establishes the existence of equilibrium in the above weak sense:
Theorem 2.12. Assume that v˜ satisfies (1.1) with N < ∞. Then asymptotic Glosten-Milgrom
equilibrium exists.
In this asymptotic equilibrium, the pricing rule is given by (2.5). When the order size is δ, the
insider employs the strategy (XB,δ ,XS,δ;FI,δ) with FI,δ-intensities
δβδ
N∑
n=1
I{v˜δ=vn}
[
hδn(Y
δ
t− + δ, t)
hδn(Y
δ
t−, t)
− 1
]
+
+ δβδ
N∑
n=1
I{v˜δ=vn}
[
hδn(Y
δ
t− − δ, t)
hδn(Y
δ
t−, t)
− 1
]
−
,
δβδ
N∑
n=1
I{v˜δ=vn}
[
hδn(Y
δ
t− − δ, t)
hδn(Y
δ
t−, t)
− 1
]
+
+ δβδ
N∑
n=1
I{v˜δ=vn}
[
hδn(Y
δ
t− + δ, t)
hδn(Y
δ
t−, t)
− 1
]
−
,
(2.11)
respectively. In particular, when the fundamental value is vn, the insider trades toward the middle
level mδn := (a
δ
n + a
δ
n+1 − δ)/2 of the interval [aδn, aδn+1): when the total demand is less than mδn,
the insider only places buy orders by either complementing noise buy orders or canceling some of
noise sell orders, when the total demand is larger than mδn, the insider does exactly the opposite.
More specifically, Lemma 5.2 below shows that y 7→ hδn(y, t) is strictly increasing when y < mδn
and strictly decreasing when y > mδn. Therefore, when Y
δ
t− < mδn, (2.11) implies that: XB,B,δ has
intensity 12δ
(
hδn(Y
δ
t−+δ,t)
hδn(Y
δ
t−,t)
− 1
)
, XB,S,δ has intensity 12δ
(
1− h
δ
n(Y
δ
t−−δ,t)
hδn(Y
δ
t−,t)
)
, meanwhile intensities of
XS,S,δ and XS,B,δ are both zero. When Y δr− > mδn, intensities can be read out from (2.11) similarly.
Even though Theorem 2.6 remains valid when the insider is prohibited from trading at the same
time with noise traders, the strategy constructed above depends on the possibility of canceling
orders. However, in this strategy, the insider never tops up noise orders, i.e., XB,T = XS,T ≡ 0.
This allows the market maker to employ a rational pricing mechanism so that Definition 2.11 ii) is
satisfied, cf. Remark 4.6 below.
The processes (XB,δ ,XS,δ;FI,δ) with intensities (2.11) will be constructed explicitly in Section
5. The insider employs a sequence of independent random variables with uniform distribution on
[0, 1] to construct her mixed strategy. This sequence of random variables are also independent
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of Zδ and v˜δ. This construction is a natural extension of [10]. In this construction, whenever a
noise order arrives, the insider uses a uniform distributed random variable to decide whether or not
submitting an opposite canceling order. Hence this strategy is adapted to insider’s filtration, rather
than predictable as in the Kyle model. Such a canceling strategy is called input regulation and has
been studied extensively in the queueing theory literature, see eg. [7, Chapter VII, Section 3].
When the fundamental value is vn and the insider follows the aforementioned strategy, the total
demand at time 1 will end up in the interval [aδn, a
δ
n+1). Therefore the insider’s private information
is fully, albeit gradually, revealed to the public so that the trading price does not jump when the
fundamental value is announced. On the other hand, the total demand, in its own filtration, has
the same distribution of the demand from noise traders, i.e., the insider is able to hide her trades
among the noise trades. This is another manifestation of inconspicuous trading theorem commonly
observed in the insider trading literature (cf. e.g., [16], [2], [4], etc.).
The insider’s strategy discussed above is of feedback form. The insider can determine her trades
only using the current total cumulative demand (and some additional randomness coming from the
sequence of iid uniform distributed random variables which are also independent of the fundamental
value and the noise trades). Even though this strategy is not optimal, its associated expected profit
is close to the optimal value when the order size is small. Moreover the discrepancy converges to
zero as the order size diminishes.
The following numeric example illustrates the convergence of the upper bound for insider’s ex-
pected profit loss as the order size decreases to zero. In this example, v˜ takes values in {1, 2, 3} with
probability 0.55, 0.35, and 0.1, respectively. The expected profit in Kyle-Back equilibrium is 0.512.
Compared to this, the following figure shows that the loss to insider’s expected profit is small.
00.050.10.150.2
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
Delta (Order Size)
Va
lu
e
 
 
Potential profit loss
Standard deviation
Figure 1. The mean and standard deviation of the upper bound for insider’s ex-
pected profit loss. The figure is generated by Monte Carlo simulation with 105 paths.
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Finally, similar to Proposition 2.10 iii), insider’s net order in the asymptotic Glosten Milgrom
equilibrium converges to the optimal strategy in the Kyle model as the order size decreases to zero.
Theorem 2.13. Let (XB,δ ,XS,δ,FI,δ)δ>0 be the sequence of insider’s strategy in Theorem 2.12.
Then
XB,δ −XS,δ L−→ X0 as δ ↓ 0,
where X0 is the optimal strategy in Kyle model.
3. Optimizers in the HJB equation are not optimal control
Theorem 2.6 will be proved in this section. Let us first make the heuristic argument for the
HJB equation rigorous by using the dynamic programming principle and standard arguments for
viscosity solutions. To this end, recall the domain of Hamilton:
dom(H) := {(vn, y, t, V ) ∈ {v1, · · · , vN} × δZ× [0, 1] × R− valued functions |H(vn, y, t, V ) <∞} .
Observe that control variables for (2.9) are chosen in [0,∞). Hence (vn, y, t, V ) ∈ dom(H) if
V (y + δ, t) − V (y, t) + (vn − p(y + δ, t))δ ≤ 0,(3.1)
V (y − δ, t) − V (y, t)− (vn − p(y − δ, t))δ ≤ 0.(3.2)
Moreover, when (vn, y, t, V ) ∈ dom(H), the Hamilton is reduced to
(3.3) H(vn, y, t, V ) = (V (y + δ, t) − 2V (y, t) + V (y − δ, t))β.
Hence (2.8) reads
(3.4) − Vt − (V (y + δ, t) − 2V (y, t) + V (y − δ, t))β = 0 in dom(H).
Proposition 3.1. The following statements hold for V δ, δ > 0:
i) V δ is a viscosity solution of (2.8);
ii) (vn, y, t, V
δ) ∈ dom(H) for any n ∈ {1, · · · , N} and (y, t) ∈ δZ × [0, 1). Hence V δ satisfies
(3.1), (3.2), and is a viscosity solution of (3.4);
iii) t 7→ V δ(y, t) is continuous on [0, 1];
iv) V δ(y, t) = EP
δ,y [
V δ(Zs−t, s)
]
for any y ∈ δZ, and 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ 1.
The proof is postponed to Appendix A where the dynamic programming principle together with
the definition of viscosity solutions are recalled. The proof of Theorem 2.6 also requires the following
result.
Lemma 3.2. For any δ > 0, n ∈ {1, · · · , N}, and (y, t) ∈ δZ× [0, 1), V δ(vn, y, t) > 0.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we fix δ = 1, v˜ = vn for some n ∈ {1, · · · , N}, and (y, t) = (0, 0).
The superscript δ is omitted throughout this proof. When n > 1, let us construct a strategy where
the insider buys once the asset is under-priced. Consider
τ := inf{r : p(Zr− + 1, r) < vn)} ∧ 1 and σ := inf{r > τ : ∆Yr 6= 0} ∧ 1.
Here τ is the first time that the asset is under-priced and σ is the arrival time of the first order
after τ . The insider employs a strategy with intensity θB,Br = I{τ≤r≤σ} and all other intensities
zero. Then the associated expected profit is
E
[∫ 1
0
(vn − a(Yr−, r)) I{τ≤r≤σ}dr
]
= E
[∫ σ
τ
(vn − p(Zr− + 1, r)) dr
]
> 0,
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where the inequality follows from the definition of τ and the fact that P(τ < 1) > 0 due to Definition
2.1 ii). When n = 1, set τ := inf{t : p(Zt−− 1, t) > v1} ∧ 1 and θS,St = I{τ≤t≤σ}. Argument similar
as above shows that this selling strategy also leads to positive expected profit. Therefore, in both
cases, V > 0 is verified. 
Proof of Theorem 2.6. Without loss of generality, we set δ = 1 and omit the superscript δ through-
out the proof.
Step 1: For any n ∈ {1, · · · , N}, either one of the following situations holds:
• (3.1) holds as an equality and (3.2) is a strict inequality at all (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1);
• (3.2) holds as an equality and (3.1) is a strict inequality at all (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1).
To prove the assertion, observe from (3.1) and (3.2) that
p(y, t)− vn ≤ V (y + 1, t)− V (y, t) ≤ p(y + 1, t) − vn, (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1).
Since y 7→ p(y, t) is strictly increasing for any t ∈ [0, 1), there exists η(y, t) ∈ [0, 1] such that
V (y + 1, t)− V (y, t) = p(y, t) + η(y, t) (p(y + 1, t) − p(y, t))− vn, (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1).
Assume that either (3.1) or (3.2) holds as an equality at some point. If such assumption fails,
both inequalities in (3.1) and (3.2) are strict at all points in Z× [0, 1). Then all optimizers in (2.9)
are identically zero, with the associated expected profit zero. Since V > 0, cf. Lemma 3.2, these
trivial optimizers are not optimal strategies for (2.7). Hence the statement of the theorem is already
confirmed in this trivial situation. Let us now assume (3.2) holds as an equality at (y0 + 1, t0), we
will show (3.2) is an identity. On the other hand, combining the identity in (3.2) and the strict
monotonicity of y 7→ p(y, t), we obtain
V (y + 1, t)− V (y, t) = p(y, t)− vn < p(y + 1, t) − vn, (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1),
hence the inequality (3.1) is always strict. The other situation where (3.1) is an identity and (3.2)
is strict can be proved analogously.
Since (3.2) holds as an equality at (y0 + 1, t0), then, for any s ∈ (t0, 1),
Ey0 [p(Zs−t0 , s)]−vn = p(y0, t0)−vn = V (y0+1, t0)−V (y0, t0) = Ey0 [V (Zs−t0 + 1, s)− V (Zs−t0 , s)] ,
where the first identity follows from (2.5) and the Markov property of Z, the third identity is
obtained after applying Proposition 3.1 iv) twice. On the other hand, the definition of η(y, t) yields
Ey0 [V (Zs−t0 + 1, s)− V (Zs−t0 , s)] = Ey0 [p(Zs−t0 , s) + η(Zs−t0 , s) (p(Zs−t0 + 1, s)− p(Zs−t0 , s))]−vn.
The last two identities combined imply
(3.5) Ey0 [η(Zs−t0 , s) (p(Zs−t0 + 1, s)− p(Zs−t0 , s))] = 0.
Recall that η ≥ 0, p(·+ 1, s) − p(·, s) > 0 for any s < 1, and the distribution of Zs0−t has positive
mass on each point in Z. We then conclude from (3.5) that η(y, s) = 0 for any y ∈ Z. Since s is
arbitrarily chosen,
(3.6) η(y, s) = 0, for any y ∈ Z, t0 < s < 1.
Now fix s, the previous identity yields, for any t < s and y ∈ Z,
V (y + 1, t) − V (y, t) = Ey [V (Zs−t + 1, s)− V (Zs−t, s)] = Ey [p(Zs−t, s)]− vn = p(y, t)− vn,
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where Proposition 3.1 iv) is applied twice again to obtain the first identity. Therefore η(y, t) = 0
for any y ∈ Z and t ≤ s, which combined with (3.6), implies (3.2) is an identity.
Step 2: Fix 1 < n < N . When (3.2) is an identity, any optimizers in (2.9) are shown not to be
the optimal strategy for (2.7). When (3.1) is an identity, a similar argument leads to the same
conclusion. Combined with the result in Step 1, the statement of the theorem is confirmed.
When (3.2) is an identity, sending t→ 1, V (y, 1), defined as limt→1 V (y, t), satisfies
V (y − 1, 1) − V (y, 1) = vn − P (y − 1).
The previous identity and (2.6) combined imply that V (y, 1) is strictly decreasing when y < an+1,
constant when y ∈ [an +1, an+1 +1), and strictly increasing when y ≥ an+1+ 1. Thus y 7→ V (y, 1)
attains its minimum value when y ∈ [an + 1, an+1]. Let (XˆB , XˆS) be the point processes whose
FI -intensities are optimizers θˆi,j, i ∈ {B,S} and j ∈ {B,T, S}, in (2.9), and set Yˆ = Z+ XˆB− XˆS .
Assuming that (XˆB , XˆS) is the optimal strategy for (2.7), DPP i) in Appendix A implies
V (y, t)
≥Ey,t
[
V (Yˆ1, 1)
+
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yˆr− + 1, r))dXˆB,Br +
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yˆr− + 2, r))dXˆB,Tr +
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yˆr−, r))dXˆB,Sr
−
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yˆr− − 1, r))dXˆS,Sr −
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yˆr− − 2, r))dXˆS,Tr −
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yˆr−, r))dXˆS,Br
]
,
where the expectation is taken under Py,t with Py,t(Yˆt = y) = 1. However, the value function V (y, t)
is exactly the expected profit when the insider employs the optimal strategy (XˆB , XˆS). Therefore,
the previous identity yields
Ey,t[V (Yˆ1, 1)] = 0.
Recall that V (·, 1), as limit of positive functions, is nonnegative, and it achieves the minimum at
[an + 1, an+1]. The previous identity implies V (y, 1) = 0 when y ∈ [an + 1, an+1] and
(3.7) Yˆ1 ∈ [an + 1, an+1], Py,t − a.s..
However, when (3.2) is an identity and (3.1) is a strict inequality, any optimizer of (2.9) satisfies
θˆB,B = θˆB,S ≡ 0, i.e., XˆB ≡ 0. Therefore, Yˆ = ZB −ZS − XˆS with only negative controlled jumps
from XˆS cannot compensate ZS to satisfy (3.7), where [an + 1, an+1] is a finite interval in Z when
1 < n < N . 
4. A suboptimal strategy
We start to prepare the proof of Theorem 2.12 from this section.
For the rest of the paper, N <∞, assumed in Theorem 2.12, is enforced unless stated otherwise.
In this section we are going to characterize a suboptimal strategy of feedback form in the Glosten
Milgrom model with order size δ, such that the pricing rule (2.5) is rational. To simplify presenta-
tion, we will take δ = 1, hence omit all superscript δ, throughout this section. Scaling all processes
by δ gives the desired processes when the order size is δ.
The following standing assumption on distribution of v˜ will be enforced throughout this section:
Assumption 4.1. There exists a strictly increasing sequence (an)n=1,··· ,N+1 such that
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i) an ∈ Z ∪ {−∞,∞}, a1 = −∞, aN+1 =∞, and ∪Nn=1[an, an+1) = Z ∪ {−∞};
ii) P(Z1 ∈ [an, an+1)) = P(v˜ = vn), n = 1, · · · , N ;
iii) The middle level mn = (an + an+1 − 1)/2 of the interval [an, an+1) is not an integer.
Item i) and ii) have already been assumed in Assumption 2.4. Item iii) is a technical as-
sumption which facilities the construction of the suboptimal strategy. In the next section, when
an arbitrary v˜ of distribution (1.1) is considered and the order size δ converges to zero, a se-
quence (aδn)n=1,··· ,N+1,δ>0 together with a sequence of random variables (v˜δ)δ>0 will be constructed,
such that Assumption 4.1 is satisfied for each δ and v˜δ converges to v˜ in law. To simplify no-
tation, we denote by mn := ⌊(an + an+1 − 1)/2⌋ the largest integer smaller than mn and by
mn := ⌈(an + an+1 − 1)/2⌉ the smallest integer larger than mn. Assumption 4.1 iii) implies
an ≤ mn < mn < mn < an+1 and mn −mn = 1 when both an and an+1 are finite.
Let us now define a function U , which relates to the expected profit of a suboptimal strategy and
also dominates the value function V . First the Markov property Z implies that p is continuously
differentiable in the time variable and satisfies8
pt + (p(y + 1, t)− 2p(y, t) + p(y − 1, t)) β = 0, (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1),
p(y, 1) = P (y).
(4.1)
Define
(4.2) U(vn, y, 1) :=
an−1∑
j=y
(vn −A(j)) I{y≤mn} +
y∑
j=an+1
(B(j) − vn) I{y≥mn}, y ∈ Z, 1 ≤ n ≤ N,
where A(y) := P (y + 1) and B(y) := P (y − 1) can be considered as ask and bid pricing functions
right before time 1. Since (vn)n=1,··· ,N is increasing, U(·, ·, 1) is nonnegative and
(4.3) U(vn, y, 1) = 0 ⇐⇒ y ∈ [an − 1, an+1 + 1).
Given U(·, ·, 1) as above, U is extended to t ∈ [0, 1) as follows:
U(vn, y, t) := U(vn, y, 1) + β
∫ 1
t
(p(y, r)− p(y − 1, r)) dr, y ≥ mn,(4.4)
U(vn, y, t) := U(vn, y, 1) + β
∫ 1
t
(p(y + 1, r)− p(y, r)) dr, y ≤ mn,(4.5)
for t ∈ [0, 1) and n = 1, · · · , N . Since N is finite, p is bounded, hence U takes finite value.
Proposition 4.2. Let Assumption 4.1 hold. Suppose that the market maker chooses p in (2.5)
as the pricing rule. Then for any insider’s admissible strategy (XB ,XS ;FI), with FI-intensities
θi,j, i ∈ {B,S} and j ∈ {B,T, S}, the associated expected profit function J (vn, y, t;XB ,XS) satisfies
(4.6) J (vn, y, t;XB ,XS) ≤ U(vn, y, t)− L(vn, y, t), n ∈ {1, · · · , N}, (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1].
8This follows from the same argument as in [10, Footnote 4].
ASYMPTOTIC GLOSTEN MILGROM EQUILIBRIUM 15
where
L(vn, y, t)
:= Ey
[∫ 1
t
(vn − p(mn, r))
[(
β − θB,Sr + θS,Sr
)
I{Yr−=mn} + θ
S,T
r I{Yr−=mn+1}
]
dr
∣∣∣∣ v˜ = vn
]
− Ey
[∫ 1
t
(vn − p(mn, r))
[(
β − θS,Br + θB,Br
)
I{Yr−=mn} + θ
B,T
r I{Yr−=mn−1}
]
dr
∣∣∣∣ v˜ = vn
]
.
(4.7)
Moreover (4.6) is an identity when the following conditions are satisfied:
i) Y1 ∈ [an − 1, an+1 + 1) a.s. when v˜ = vn;
ii) XS,St = X
S,B
t ≡ 0 when Yt− ≤ mn, XB,Bt = XB,St ≡ 0 when Yt− ≥ mn, θB,T ≡ 0 when y ≥ mn,
and θS,T ≡ 0 when y ≤ mn.
Before proving this result, let us derive equations that U satisfies. The following result shows
that U satisfies (3.4) except when y = mn and y = mn, and U satisfies the identity in either (3.1)
or (3.2) depending on whether y ≤ mn or y ≥ mn.
Lemma 4.3. The function U satisfies the following equations: (Here v˜ = vn is fixed and the
dependence on v˜ is omitted in U .)
Ut + (U(y + 1, t)− 2U(y, t) + U(y − 1, t)) β = 0, y > mn or y < mn,(4.8)
Ut + (U(y + 1, t)− 2U(y, t) + U(y − 1, t)) β = (p(mn, t)− vn)β, y = mn,(4.9)
Ut + (U(y + 1, t)− 2U(y, t) + U(y − 1, t)) β = (vn − p(mn, t))β, y = mn,(4.10)
U(y, t)− U(y + 1, t) − (vn − p(y, t)) = 0, y ≥ mn,(4.11)
U(y, t)− U(y − 1, t) + (vn − p(y, t)) = 0, y ≤ mn,(4.12)
Proof. We will only verify these equations when y ≥ mn. The remaining equations can be proved
similarly. First (4.2) implies
U(y + 1, 1) − U(y, 1) = B(y + 1)− vn = P (y)− vn, y ≥ mn.
Combining the previous identity with (4.4),
U(y + 1, t)− U(y, t) = U(y + 1, 1) − U(y, 1) + β
∫ 1
t
(p(y + 1, r)− 2p(y, r) + p(y − 1, r)) dr
= p(y, t)− vn,
where (4.1) is used to obtain the second identity. This verifies (4.11). When y > mn, summing up
(4.11) at y and y + 1, and taking time derivative in (4.4), yield
Ut + (U(y + 1, t) − 2U(y, t) + U(y − 1, t)) β
= −β(p(y, t)− p(y − 1, t)) + β(p(y, t)− p(y − 1, t))
= 0,
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which confirms (4.8) when y > mn. When y = mn, observe from (4.2), (4.4) and (4.5) that
U(mn, ·) = U(mn, ·). Then
Ut + (U(y + 1, t) − 2U(y, t) + U(y − 1, t)) β
= −β (p(mn, t)− p(mn, t)) + β (U(mn + 1, t)− U(mn, t))
= −β (p(mn, t)− p(mn, t))− β (vn − p(mn, t))
= β (p(mn, t)− vn) ,
where the second identity follows from (4.11). 
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Throughout the proof the v˜ = vn is fixed and the dependence on v˜ is
omitted in U . Let Y B = ZB+XB,B+XB,T −XS,B and Y S = ZS+XS,S+XS,T −XB,S be positive
and negative parts of Y respectively. Then Y B − ∫ ·0(β − θS,Br − θB,Tr )dr − ∫ ·0 θB,Br dr − 2 ∫ ·0 θB,Tr dr
and Y S−∫ ·0(β−θB,Sr −θS,Tr )dr−∫ ·0 θS,Sr dr−2 ∫ ·0 θS,Tr dr are FI -martingales. Applying Itoˆ’s formula
to U(Y·, ·), we obtain
U(Y1, 1)
=U(y, t) +
∫ 1
t
Ut(Yr−, r)dr
+
∫ 1
t
[U(Yr, r)− U(Yr−, r)] dY Br +
∫ 1
t
[U(Yr, r)− U(Yr−, r)] dY Sr
=U(y, t) +
∫ 1
t
[Ut(Yr−, r) + (U(Yr− + 1, r)− 2U(Yr−, r) + U(Yr− − 1, r)) β] dr
+
∫ 1
t
[U(Yr− + 1, r)− U(Yr−, r)]
(
θB,Br − θS,Br
)
dr
+
∫ 1
t
[U(Yr− + 2, r)− U(Yr− + 1, r)] θB,Tr dr
+
∫ 1
t
[U(Yr− − 1, r)− U(Yr−, r)]
(
θS,Sr − θB,Sr
)
dr
+
∫ 1
t
[U(Yr− − 2, r)− U(Yr− − 1, r)] θS,Tr dr +M1 −Mt,
(4.13)
where
M =
∫ ·
0
[U(Yr, r)− U(Yr−, r)] d
(
Y Br −
∫ r
0
(
β − θS,Bu + θB,Bu + θB,Tu
)
du
)
+
∫ ·
0
[U(Yr, r)− U(Yr−, r)] d
(
Y Sr −
∫ r
0
(
β − θB,Su + θS,Su + θS,Tu
)
du
)
.
Since (4.11) and (4.12) imply U(y+1, t)−U(y, t) is either p(y, t)− vn or p(y+1, t)− vn, which are
both bounded from below by v1− vn and from above by vN − vn, hence M is an FI -martingale (cf.
[7, Chapter I, T6]). On the right hand side of (4.13), splitting the second integral on {Yr− ≥ mn},
{Yr− = mn}, and {Yr− < mn}, splitting the fourth integral on {Yr− > mn}, {Yr− = mn}, and
{Yr− ≤ mn}, utilizing U(mn, ·) = U(mn, ·), as well as different equations in Lemma 4.3 in different
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regions, we obtain
U(Y1, 1)
= U(y, t) +
∫ 1
t
(p(mn, r)− vn) βI{Yr−=mn}dr +
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(mn, r)) βI{Yr−=mn}dr
−
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr−, r)) I{Yr−≥mn}(θB,Br − θS,Br )dr −
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− + 1, r)) I{Yr−<mn}(θB,Br − θS,Br )dr
−
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− + 1, r)) I{Yr−≥mn}θB,Tr dr −
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− + 2, r)) I{Yr−<mn−1}θB,Tr dr
+
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− − 1, r)) I{Yr−>mn}(θS,Sr − θB,Sr )dr +
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr−, r)) I{Yr−≤mn}(θS,Sr − θB,Sr )dr
+
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− − 2, r)) I{Yr−>mn+1}θS,Tr dr +
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− − 1, r)) I{Yr−≤mn}θS,Tr dr
+M1 −Mt.
Rearranging the previous identity by putting the profit of (XB ,XS) to the left hand side, we obtain
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− + 1, r))θB,Br dr +
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− + 2, r)) θB,Tr dr +
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr−, r))θB,Sr dr
−
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− − 1, r))θS,Sr dr −
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− − 2, r)) θS,Tr dr −
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr−, r))θS,Br dr
=U(y, t)− U(Y1, 1)−K − L+M1 −Mt,
(4.14)
where
K =
∫ 1
t
(p(Yr− + 1, r)− p(Yr−, r)) I{Yr−≥mn}θB,Br dr +
∫ 1
t
(p(Yr−, r)− p(Yr− − 1, r)) I{Yr−≥mn}θB,Sr dr∫ 1
t
(p(Yr− + 2, r)− p(Yr− + 1, r)) I{Yr−≥mn}θB,Tr dr
+
∫ 1
t
(p(Yr−, r)− p(Yr− − 1, r)) I{Yr−≤mn}θS,Sr dr +
∫ 1
t
(p(Yr− + 1, u) − p(Yr−, r)) I{Yr−≤mn}θS,Br dr
+
∫ 1
t
(p(Yr− − 1, r)− p(Yr− − 2, r)) I{Yr−≤mn}θS,Tr dr,
L =
∫ 1
t
[vn − p(mn, r)]
[
(β − θB,Sr + θS,Sr )I{Yr−=mn} + θS,Tr I{Yr−=mn+1}
]
dr
−
∫ 1
t
[vn − p(mn, r)]
[
(β − θS,Br + θB,Br )I{Yr−=mn} + θB,Tr I{Yr−=mn−1}
]
dr.
Taking conditional expectation E[·|FIt , Yt = y] on both sides of (4.14), the left hand side is the
expected profit J (XB ,XS), while, on the right hand side, both U(·, 1) and K are nonnegative
(cf. Definition 2.1 i)). Therefore (4.6) is verified. To attain the identity in (4.6), we need i)
Y1 ∈ [an − 1, an+1 + 1) a.s. so that U(Y1, 1) = 0 a.s. follows from (4.3); ii) θB,B = θB,S ≡ 0 when
y ≥ mn, θS,S = θS,B ≡ 0 when y ≤ mn, θB,T ≡ 0 when y ≥ mn, and θS,T ≡ 0 when y ≤ mn. 
Come back to the statement of Proposition 4.2. If the insider chooses a strategy such that both
conditions in i) and ii) are satisfied, then the identity in (4.6) is attained, hence the expected profit
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of this strategy is U − L. On the other hand, define US : {v1, · · · , vN} × Z× [0, 1]→ R via
(4.15) US(vn, y, t) =
{
U(vn, y, t) y ≥ mn
U(vn, y − 1, t) y ≤ mn
.
The next result shows that US dominates the value function V , therefore US −U +L is the upper
bound of the potential loss of the expected profit. In Section 6, we will prove this potential loss
converges to zero as δ ↓ 0. Therefore, when the order size is small, the insider losses little expected
profit by employing a strategy satisfying Proposition 4.2 i) and ii).
Proposition 4.4. Let Assumption 4.1 hold. Then V ≤ US, hence V <∞, on {v1, · · · , vN} × Z×
[0, 1].
Proof. Fix vn and omit it as the first argument of U
S and U throughout the proof. We first verify
US(y, t)− US(y + 1, t)− (vn − p(y, t)) = 0,(4.16)
USt +
(
US(y + 1, t)− 2US(y, t) + US(y − 1, t)) β = 0,(4.17)
for any (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1). Indeed, when y ≥ mn, (4.16) is exactly (4.11). When y = mn,
US(mn, t)− US(mn, t) = U(mn − 1, t)− U(mn, t) = U(mn − 1, t)− U(mn, t) = vn − p(mn, t),
where the second identity follows from U(mn, t) = U(mn, t) and the third identity holds due to
(4.12). When y < mn,
US(y, t)− US(y + 1, t) = U(y − 1, t)− U(y, t) = vn − p(y, t),
where (4.12) is utilized again to obtain the second identity. Therefore (4.16) is confirmed for all
cases. As for (4.17), (4.16) yields
US(y + 1, t) − 2US(y, t) + US(y − 1, t) = p(y, t)− p(y − 1, t).
On the other hand, we have from (4.4) and (4.5) that
USt (y, t) =
{
Ut(y, t) = −β(p(y, t)− p(y − 1, t)) y ≥ mn
Ut(y − 1, t) = −β(p(y, t)− p(y − 1, t)) y ≤ mn
.
Therefore (4.17) is confirmed after combining the previous two identities.
Now note that US(·, 1) ≥ 0, moreover US satisfies (4.16) and (4.17). The assertion V ≤ US
follows from the same argument as in the high type of [10, Proposition 3.2]. 
Having studied the insider’s optimization problem, let us turn to the market maker. Given
(XB ,XS ;FI), Definition 2.11 ii) requires the pricing rule to be rational. This leads to another
constraint on (XB ,XS ;FI).
Proposition 4.5. If there exists an admissible strategy (XB ,XS ;FI) such that
i) Y B = ZB + XB,B + XB,T − XS,B and Y S = ZS + XS,S + XS,T − XB,S are independent
FY−adapted Poisson processes with common intensity β;
ii) [Y1 ∈ [an, an+1)] = [v˜ = vn], n = 1, · · · , N .
Then the pricing rule (2.5) is rational.
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Proof. For any t ∈ [0, 1],
p(Yt, t) = E
Yt[P (Z1−t)] = E [P (Z1) |Zt = Yt] = E
[
P (Y1) | FYt
]
= E[v˜ | FYt ],
where the third identity holds since Y and Z have the same distribution, the fourth identity follows
from ii) and (2.6). 
Remark 4.6. If the insider places a buy (resp. sell) order when a noise buy (resp. sell) order arrives,
Proposition 4.5 i) cannot be satisfied. Therefore in the asymptotic equilibrium the insider will not
trade in the same direction as the noise traders, i.e., XB,T = XS,T ≡ 0, so that the market maker
can employ a rational pricing rule.
Concluding this section, we need to construct point processes (XB ,XS ;FI) which simultaneously
satisfy conditions in Proposition 4.2 ii), Proposition 4.5 i) and ii)9. This construction is a natural
extension of [10, Section 4], where N = 2 is considered, and will be presented in the next section.
5. Construction of a point process bridge
In this section, we will construct point processesXB andXS on a probability space (Ω,FI , (FIt )t∈[0,1],P)
such that XB,T = XS,T ≡ 0, due to Remark 4.6, and satisfy
i) Y B = ZB +XB,B −XS,B and Y S = ZS +XS,S −XB,S are independent FY -adapted Poisson
processes with common intensity β;
ii) XB,Bt = X
B,S
t ≡ 0 when Yt− ≥ mn, XS,St = XS,Bt ≡ 0 when Yt− ≤ mn;
iii) [Y1 ∈ [an, an+1)] = [v˜ = vn] P-a.s. for n = 1, · · · , N .
The construction is a natural extension of [10] where N = 2 is considered. As in [10], XB and XS
are constructed using two independent sequences of iid random variables (ηi)i≥1 and (ζi)i≥1 with
uniform distribution on [0, 1], moreover they are independent of Z and v˜. The insider uses (ηi)i≥1
to randomly contribute either buy or sell orders, and uses (ζi)i≥1 to randomly cancel noise orders.
Throughout this section Assumption 4.1 is enforced. Moreover, we set δ = 1, hence suppress the
superscript δ. Otherwise XB and XS can be scaled by δ to obtain the desired processes.
In the following construction, we will define a probability space (Ω,FI , (FIt )t∈[0,1],P) on which
Y takes the form
(5.1) Y = Z +
N∑
n=1
IAn(X
B −XS).
Here Z is the difference of two independent FI -adapted Poisson processes with intensity β, An ∈ FI0
such that P(An) = P(Z1 ∈ [an, an+1)) for each n = 1, · · · , N .
Before constructing XB and XS satisfying desired properties, let us draw some intuition from the
theory of filtration enlargement. Let us define (D([0, 1],Z),F , (F t)t∈[0,1],P) be the canonical space
where D([0, 1],Z) is Z-valued ca`dla`g functions, P is a probability measure under which ZB and ZS
are independent Poisson processes with intensities β, (F t)t∈[0,1] is the minimal filtration generated
by ZB and ZS satisfying the usual conditions, and F = ∨t∈[0,1]F t. Let us denote by (Gt)t∈[0,1] the
filtration (F t)t∈[0,1] enlarged with a sequence of random variables (I{Z1∈[an,an+1)})n=1,··· ,N .
In order to find the G-intensities of ZB and ZS, we use a standard enlargement of filtration
argument which can be found, e.g. in [18]. To this end, recall hn(y, t) = P[Z1 ∈ [an, an+1) |Zt = y].
9Note is Proposition 4.5 ii) implies Proposition 4.2 i).
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Note that hn is strictly positive on Z × [0, 1). Moreover the Markov property of Z implies hn is
continuously differentiable in the time variable and satisfies
∂thn + (hn(y + 1, t)− 2hn(y, t) + hn(y − 1, t)) β = 0, (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1),
hn(y, 1) = I{y∈[an,an+1)}.
(5.2)
Lemma 5.1. The G-intensities of ZB and ZS at t ∈ [0, 1) are given by
N∑
n=1
I{Z1∈[an,an+1)}
hn(Zt− + 1, t)
hn(Zt−, t)
β and
N∑
n=1
I{Z1∈[an,an+1)}
hn(Zt− − 1, t)
hn(Zt−, t)
β,
respectively.
Proof. We will only calculate the intensity for ZB. The intensity of ZS can be obtained similarly.
All expectations are taken under P throughout this proof. For s ≤ t < 1, take an arbitrary E ∈ Fs
and denote MBt := Z
B
t − βt. The definition of hn and the F -martingale property of MB imply
E
[
(MBt −MBs )IEI{Z1∈[an,an+1)}
]
= E
[
(MBt −MBs )IEhn(Zt, t)
]
= E
[
IE(〈MB , hn(Z·, ·)〉t − 〈MB , hn(Z·, ·)〉s)
]
= E
[
IE
∫ t
s
β (hn(Zr− + 1, r)− hn(Zr−, r)) dr
]
= E
[
IE
∫ t
s
β I{Z1∈[an,an+1)}
hn(Zr− + 1, r)− hn(Zr−, r)
hn(Zr−, r)
dr
]
.
These computations for each n = 1, · · · , N imply that
MB −
∫ ·
s
β
N∑
n=1
I{Z1∈[an,an+1)}
hn(Zr− + 1, r)− hn(Zr−, r)
hn(Zr−, r)
dr
defines a G-martingale. Therefore the G-intensity of ZB follows from ZBt =MBt + βt. 
To better understand intensities in the previous lemma, let us collect several properties for hn:
Lemma 5.2. Let Assumption 4.1 hold. The following properties hold for each hn, n = 1, · · · , N :
i) hn(·, ·) = hn(2mn − ·, ·); in particular, hn(mn, ·) = hn(mn, ·).
ii) y 7→ hn(y, t) is strictly increasing when y ≤ mn and strictly decreasing when y ≥ mn.
Here, when n = 1 (resp. n = N), mn = mn = −∞ (resp. mn = mn =∞).
Proof. Recall that an + an+1 − 1 = 2mn. Then
hn(y, t) = P[Z1 ∈ [an, an+1) |Zt = y] = P[y + Z1−t ∈ [an, an+1)]
= P[2mn − y − Z1−t ∈ (2mn − an+1, 2mn − an]]
= P[2mn − y − Z1−t ∈ [an, an+1)] = hn(2mn − y, t),
where the last identity holds since Z and −Z have the same distribution. This verifies i). To prove
ii), rewrite hn(y, t) = P[Z1−t ∈ [an− y, an+1− y)]. Then the statement ii) follows from the fact that
y 7→ P(Z1−t = y) is strictly increasing when y ≤ 0 and strictly decreasing when y ≥ 0. 
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In what follows, given An ∈ FI0 such that P(An) = P(Z1 ∈ [an, an+1)), (XB ,XS ;FI) on An will
be constructed so that FI -intensity of Y B (resp. Y S) on An match G-intensities of ZB (resp. ZS) on
[Z1 ∈ [an, an+1)]. Matching these intensities ensures that (XB ,XS ;FI) satisfies desired properties,
cf. Proposition 5.5 below. Recall Y B = ZB+XB,B−XS,B and Y S = ZS+XS,S−XB,S . Subtracting
β from G-intensities of ZB (resp. ZS) in Lemma 5.1, we can read out intensities of XB,B −XS,B
(resp. XS,S − XB,S). Since property ii) at the beginning of this section implies that θB and θS
are never positive at the same time. Therefore, when the intensity of XB,B −XS,B is positive, the
insider contributes buy orders XB,B with such intensity, otherwise the insider submits sell orders
XS,B with the same intensity to cancel some noise buy orders from ZB. Applying the same strategy
to XS,S −XB,S and utilizing Lemma 5.2, we read out FI -intensities for Xi,j , i, j ∈ {B,S}:
Corollary 5.3. Suppose that FI-intensities of Y B and Y S match G-intensities of ZB and ZS
respectively, moreover XB,Bt = X
B,S
t ≡ 0 when Yt− ≥ mn and XS,St = XS,Bt ≡ 0 when Yt− ≤ mn.
Then FI-intensities of Xi,j , i, j ∈ {B,S}, have the following form on An when Yt− = y:
θB,B(y, t) =
(
hn(y + 1, t)
hn(y, t)
− 1
)
+
β, θB,S(y, t) =
(
hn(y − 1, t)
hn(y, t)
− 1
)
−
β,
θS,S(y, t) =
(
hn(y − 1, t)
hn(y, t)
− 1
)
+
β, θS,B(y, t) =
(
hn(y + 1, t)
hn(y, t)
− 1
)
−
β.
In particular, θi,j, i, j ∈ {B,S}, satisfies the following properties:
i) θB,B(y, ·) = θB,S(y, ·) ≡ 0, θS,S(y, ·) > 0, and θS,B(y, ·) > 0, when y ≥ mn; θS,S(y, ·) =
θS,B(y, ·) ≡ 0, θB,B(y, ·) > 0, and θB,S(y, ·) > 0, when y ≤ mn;
ii) θB,B(·, ·) = θS,S(2mn − ·, ·), θB,S(·, ·) = θS,B(2mn − ·, ·);
iii) θB,B(mn, ·) = θS,S(mn, ·) ≡ 0.
As described in Corollary 5.3, when An ∈ F0 is fixed, the state space is divided into two domains
S := {y ∈ Z : y ≥ mn} and B := {y ∈ Z : y ≤ mn}. As Y making excursions into these two
domains, either XS or XB is active. In the following construction, we will focus on the domain
B and construct inductively jumps of XB until Y leaves B. When Y excurses in S, XS can be
constructed similarly.
When Y is in B, one of the goals of XB is to make sure that Y1 ends up in the interval [an, an+1).
In order to achieve this goal, XB will add some jumps in addition to the jumps coming from ZB.
However this by itself will not be enough since Y also jumps downward due to ZS . Thus, XB also
needs to cancel some of downwards jumps from ZS. Therefore XB consists of two components
XB,B and XB,S , where XB,B complements jumps of ZB and XB,S cancels some jumps of ZS. Let
us denote by (τi)i≥1 the sequence of jump times for Y . These stopping times will be constructed
inductively as follows. Given τi−1 < 1 and Yτi−1 ≤ mn, the next jump time τi happens at the
minimum of the following three random times:
• the next jump of ZB,
• the next jump of XB,B ,
• the next jump of ZS which is not canceled by a jump of XB,S .
Here XB,B and XB,S need to be constructed so that their intensities θB,B(Yt−, t) and θB,S(Yt−, t)
match the forms in Corollary 5.3. This goal is achieved by employing two independent sequences
of iid random variables (ηi)i≥1 and (ζi)i≥1 with uniform distribution on [0, 1]. They are also inde-
pendent of F and (An)n=1,··· ,N . These two sequences will be used to generate a random variable νi
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and another sequence of Bernoulli random variables (ξj,i)j≥1 taking values in {0, 1}. Let (σ+i )i≥1
and (σ−i )i≥1 be jump time of Z
B and ZS, respectively. Then, after τi−1, the next jump of ZB is at
σ+
ZBτi−1+1
, the next jump of XB,B is at νi, and the next jump of Z
S not canceled by jumps of XB,S
is at τ−i = min{σ−j > τi−1 : ξj,i = 1}. Then the next jump of Y is at
τi = σ
+
ZBτi−1+1
∧ νi ∧ τ−i .
The construction of νi and (ξj,i)j≥1 using (ηi)i≥1 and (ζi)i≥1 is exactly the same as in [10, Section
4], only replacing h therein by hn.
All aforementioned construction is performed in a filtrated probability space (Ω,FI , (FIt )t∈[0,1],P)
such that there exist (An)n=1,··· ,N ∈ FI0 with P(An) = hn(0, 0) and two independent sequences of iid
FI -measurable random variables (ηi)i≥1 and (ζi)i≥1 with uniform distribution on [0, 1], moreover
these two sequences are independent of both Z and (An)n=1,··· ,N . These requirements can be
satisfied by extending F0 (resp. F) to FI0 (resp. FI). As for the filtration (FIt )t∈[0,1], we require that
it is right continuous and complete under P, moreover Z, as the difference of two independent Poisson
processes with intensity β, is adapted to (FIt )t∈[0,1]. Therefore Z is independent of (An)n=1,··· ,N ,
since Z has independent increments. Finally, we also assume that (FIt )t∈[0,1] is rich enough so that
(νi)i≥1 and (τ−i )i≥1 discussed above are FI -stopping times.
An argument similar to [10, Lemma 4.3] yields:
Lemma 5.4. Given point processes (XB ,XS ;FI) constructed above, the FI-intensities of Y B and
Y S at t ∈ [0, 1) are given by
N∑
n=1
IAn
hn(Yt− + 1, t)
hn(Yt−, t)
β and
N∑
n=1
IAn
hn(Yt− − 1, t)
hn(Yt−, t)
β,
respectively.
Now we are ready to verify that our construction is as desired.
Proposition 5.5. The process Y as constructed above satisfies the following properties:
i) [Y1 ∈ [an, an+1)] = An a.s. for n = 1, · · · , N ;
ii) Y B and Y S are independent Poisson processes with intensity β with respect to the natural
filtration (FYt )t∈[0,1] of Y ;
iii) (XB ,XS ;FI) is admissible in the sense of Definition 2.2.
Proof. To verify that Y satisfies the desired properties, let us introduce an auxiliary process
(ℓt)t∈[0,1):
ℓt :=
N∑
n=1
IAn
hn(0, 0)
hn(Yt, t)
t ∈ [0, 1).
When n = 2, · · · , N−1, there is only almost surely finite number of positive (resp. negative) jumps
of Y on An when Y· ≥ mn (resp. Y· ≤ mn). Therefore Yt is finite on these An when t < 1 is
fixed. When n = 1 (resp. n = N), there is finite number of positive (resp. negative) jumps of Y
on A1 (resp. AN ) before t. Hence Yt < ∞ on A1 (resp. Yt > −∞ on AN ). This analysis implies
hn(Yt, t) > 0 on An for each n = 1, · · · , N and t < 1. Therefore (ℓt)t∈[0,1) is well defined positive
process with ℓ0 = 1.
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To prove i), we first show that ℓ is a positive FI -local martingale on [0, 1). To this end, Itoˆ
formula yields that
dℓt =
N∑
n=1
IAnℓt−
[
hn(Yt−, t)− hn(Yt− + 1, t)
hn(Yt− + 1, t)
dMBt +
hn(Yt−, t)− hn(Yt− − 1, t)
hn(Yt− − 1, t) dM
S
t
]
, t ∈ [0, 1).
Here
MB = Y B − β
∫ ·
0
N∑
n=1
IAn
hn(Yr− + 1, r)
hn(Yr−, r)
dr, MS = Y S − β
∫ ·
0
N∑
n=1
IAn
hn(Yr− − 1, r)
hn(Yr−, r)
dr
are all FI -local martingales. Define ζ+m = inf{t ∈ [0, 1] : Yt = m} and ζ−m = inf{t ∈ [0, 1] : Yt =
−m}. Consider the sequence of stopping time (ηm)m≥1:
ηm :=
(
I∪N−1n=2 Anζ
+
m ∧ ζ−m + IA1ζ+m + IAN ζ−m
)
∧ (1− 1/m).
It follows from the definition of hn that each hn(Yt, t) on An is bounded away from zero uniformly in
t ∈ [0, ηm]. This implies that ℓηm is bounded, hence ℓηm is an FI -martingale. The construction of Y
yields limm→∞ ηm = 1. Therefore, ℓ is a positive FI -local martingale, hence also a supermartingale,
on [0, 1).
Define ℓ1 := limt→1 ℓt, which exists and is finite due to Doob’s supermartingale convergence
theorem. This implies hn(Y1−, 1) > 0 on An. On the other hand, the construction of Y yields
Y S (resp. Y B) does not jump at time 1 P-a.s. when Y1− ≤ mn (resp. Y1− ≥ mn). Therefore
hn(Y1, 1) > 0 on An. However hn(·, 1) by definition can only be either 0 or 1. Hence Y1 ∈ [an, an+1)
on An, for each n = 1, · · · , N , and the statement i) is confirmed.
As for the statement ii), we will prove that Y B is an FY -adapted Poisson process. The similar
argument can be applied to Y S as well. In view of the FI -intensity of Y B calculated in Lemma
5.4, one has that, for each i ≥ 1,
Y B·∧τi∧1 − β
(∫ ·∧τi∧1
0
N∑
n=1
IAn
hn(Yu− + 1, u)
hn(Yu−, u)
du
)
is an FI -martingale, where τi is the ith jump time of Y . We will show in the next paragraph that,
when stopped at τi ∧ 1, Y B is Poisson process in FY by showing that (Y Bτi∧t − β(τi ∧ t))t∈[0,1] is an
FY -martingale. (Here note that τi is an FY -stopping time.) This in turn will imply that Y B is
a Poisson process with intensity β on [0, τ ∧ 1) where τ = limi→∞ τi is the explosion time. Since
Poisson process does not explode, this will further imply Y Bτ∧1 <∞ and, therefore, τ ≥ 1, P-a.s..
We proceed by projecting the above martingale into FY to see that
Y B − β
∫ ·
0
N∑
n=1
P(An|FYr )
hn(Yr− + 1, r)
hn(Yr−, r)
dr
is an FY -martingale when stopped at τi ∧ 1. Therefore, it remains to show that, for almost all
t ∈ [0, 1), on [t ≤ τi],
(5.3)
N∑
n=1
P(An|FYt )
hn(Yt− + 1, t)
hn(Yt−, t)
= 1, P-a.s..
To this end, we will show, on [t ≤ τi],
(5.4) P(An|FYt ) = hn(Yt, t), for t ∈ [0, 1).
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Then (5.3) follows since Yt 6= Yt− only for countably many times.
We have seen that (ℓu∧τi)u∈[0,t] is a strictly positive FI -martingale for each i. Define a probability
measure Qi ∼ P on FIt via dQi/dP|FIt = ℓτi∧t. It follows from Girsanov’s theorem that Y
B is
a Poisson process when stopped at τi ∧ t and with intensity β under Qi. Therefore, they are
independent from An under Q
i. Then, for t < 1, we obtain from the Bayes’s formula that
I{r≤τi∧t}P(An|FYr ) = I{r≤τi∧t}
EQ
i
[IAnℓ
−1
r |FYr ]
EQ
i [ℓ−1r |FYr ]
= I{r≤τi∧t}
EQ
i
[IAn
hn(Yr ,r)
hn(0,0)
|FYr ]
EQ
i[
∑N
n=1 IAn
hn(Yr ,r)
hn(0,0)
|FYr ]
= I{r≤τi∧t}hn(Yr, r),
(5.5)
where the third identity follows from the aforementioned independence of Y and An under Q
i
along with the fact that Qi does not change the probability of FI0 measurable events so that
Qi(An) = P(An) = hn(0, 0). As result, (5.4) follows from (5.5) after sending i→∞.
Since Y B and Y S are FY -Poisson processes and they do not jump simultaneously by their
construction, they are then independent. To show the strategy (XB ,XS ;FI) constructed is ad-
missible, it remains to show both E[XB1 IAn ] and E[X
S
1 IAn ] are finite for each n = 1, · · · , N . To
this end, for each n, E[XB1 IAn ] = E[X
B,B
1 IAn ] + E[X
B,S
1 IAn ], where E[X
B,S
1 IAn ] ≤ E[ZS] < ∞ and
E[XB,B1 IAn ] ≤ E[Y B1 IAn ] + E[XS,B1 IAn ] ≤ E[ZB1 |Z ∈ [an, an+1)] + E[ZS1 ] < ∞. Similar argument
also implies E[XS1 IAn ] <∞. Finally, since N <∞, p is bounded, Definition 2.2 iv) is verified using
E[XB1 IAn ],E[X
S
1 IAn ] <∞ for each n ∈ {1, . . . , N}. 
6. Convergence
Collecting results from previous sections, we will prove Theorems 2.12 and 2.13 in this section.
Let us first construct a sequence of random variables (v˜δ)δ>0, each of which will be the fundamental
value in the Glosten Milgrom model with order size δ.
Adding to the sequence of canonical spaces (Ωδ,FZ,δ, (FZ,δt )t∈[0,1],Pδ), defined at the beginning
of Section 2.2, we introduce (Ω0,F0, (F0t )t∈[0,1],P0), where Ω0 = D([0, 1],R) is the space of R-valued
ca`dla`g functions on [0, 1] with coordinate process Z0, and P0 is the Wiener measure. Denote by P0,y
the Wiener measure under which Z00 = y a.s.. Let us now define a R ∪ {−∞,∞}-valued sequence
(a0n)n=1,···N+1 via
a01 = −∞, a0n = Φ−1 (p1 + · · ·+ pn−1) , n = 2, · · · , N + 1, where Φ(·) =
∫ ·
−∞
1√
2π
e−x
2/2 dx.
Using this sequence, one can define a pricing rule following the same recipe in (2.5):
p0(y, t) :=
N∑
n=1
vnh
0
n(y, t), y ∈ R, t ∈ [0, 1], n ∈ {1, · · · , N},(6.1)
where h0n(y, t) := P
0,y
(
Z01−t ∈ [a0n, a0n+1)
)
= Φ(a0n+1 − y)− Φ(a0n − y).
As we will see later, this is exactly the pricing rule in the Kyle-Back equilibrium. Moreover, the
sequence (aδn)n=1,··· ,N+1, associated to (v˜δ)δ>0 constructed below, converges to (a0n)n=1,··· ,N+1 as
δ ↓ 0, helping to verify Definition 2.11 i).
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Lemma 6.1. For any v˜ with distribution (1.1) where N may not be finite, there exists a sequence
of random variables (v˜δ)δ>0, each of which takes value in {v1, · · · , vN}, such that
i) Assumption 4.1 is satisfied when v˜ therein is replaced by each v˜δ 10;
ii) Law(v˜δ) =⇒ Law(v˜), as δ ↓ 0. Here =⇒ represents the weak convergence of probability
measures.
Proof. For each δ > 0, v˜δ will be constructed by adjusting pn in (1.1) to some p
δ
n, n = 1, · · · , N .
Starting from [v˜ = v1], choose a
δ
1 = −∞, aδ2 = inf{y ∈ δZ : Pδ(Zδ1 ≤ y) ≥ p1}, and set Pδ(v˜δ =
v1) = P
δ(Zδ1 ∈ [aδ1, aδ2)). Moving on to [v˜δ = v2], choose aδ3 = inf{y ∈ δZ : Pδ(Zδ1 ≤ y) ≥
p1 + p2 and (a
δ
2 + y − δ)/2 /∈ δZ} and set Pδ(v˜δ = v2) = Pδ(Zδ1 ∈ [aδ2, aδ3)). Following this step, we
can define aδn inductively. When N < ∞, we set aδN+1 = ∞. This construction gives a sequence
of random variables (v˜δ)δ>0 taking values in {v1, · · · , vN} such that Pδ(v˜δ = vn) = pδn := Pδ(Zδ1 ∈
[aδn, a
δ
n+1)) with
∑N
n=1 p
δ
n = 1, moreover each sequence (a
δ
n)n=1,··· ,N+1 satisfies Assumption 4.1.
It remains to show Law(v˜δ) =⇒ Law(v˜) as δ ↓ 0. To this end, note that aδn is either the
(
∑n−1
i=1 pi)
th quantile of the distribution of Zδ1 or δ above this quantile. When β
δ is chosen as 1/(2δ2),
it follows from [12, Chapter 6, Theorem 5.4] that Pδ =⇒ P0, in particular, Law(Zδ1) =⇒ Law(Z01 ).
Therefore,
(6.2) lim
δ↓0
aδn = a
0
n, n = 1, · · · , N + 1.
For any ǫ > 0 and n ∈ {1, · · · , N}, the previous convergence yields the existence of a sufficiently
small δǫ,n, such that [a
0
n + ǫ, a
0
n+1 − ǫ) ⊆ [aδn, aδn+1) ⊆ [a0n − ǫ, a0n+1 + ǫ) for any δ ≤ δǫ,n. Hence
Pδ
(
Zδ1 ∈ [aδn, aδn+1)
)
≤ Pδ
(
Zδ1 ∈ [a0n − ǫ, a0n+1 + ǫ)
)
→ P0 (Z01 ∈ [a0n − ǫ, a0n+1 − ǫ)) ,
Pδ
(
Zδ1 ∈ [aδn, aδn+1)
)
≥ Pδ
(
Zδ1 ∈ [a0n + ǫ, a0n+1 − ǫ)
)
→ P0 (Z01 ∈ [a0n + ǫ, a0n+1 − ǫ)) , as δ ↓ 0,
where both convergence follow from Law(Zδ1) =⇒ Law(Z01 ) and the fact that the distribution of
Z01 is continuous. Since ǫ is arbitrarily chosen, utilizing the continuity of the distribution for Z
0
1
again, we obtain from the previous two inequalities
lim
δ↓0
Pδ
(
Zδ1 ∈ [aδn, aδn+1)
)
= P0
(
Z01 ∈ [a0n, a0n+1)
)
.
Hence limδ↓0 pδn = p0n for each n ∈ {1, · · ·N} and Law(v˜δ)⇒ Law(v˜). 
After (v˜δ)δ>0 is constructed, it follows from Sections 4 and 5 that a sequence of strategies
(XB,δ ,XS,δ;FI,δ)δ>0 exists, each of which satisfies conditions in Proposition 4.5. Hence pδ in (2.5)
is rational for each δ > 0. It then remain to verify Definition 2.11 iii) to establish an asymptotic
Glosten Milgrom equilibrium.
Before doing this, we prove Theorem 2.13 first. Let us recall the Kyle-Back equilibrium. Following
arguments in [16] and [2], the equilibrium pricing rule is given by (6.1) and the equilibrium demand
satisfies the SDE
Y 0 = Z0 +
N∑
n=1
I{v˜=vn}
∫ ·
0
∂yh
0
n(Y
0
r , r)
h0n(Y
0
r , r)
dr,
10When the order size is δ, Assumption 4.1 iii) reads (aδn + a
δ
n+1 − δ)/2 /∈ δZ.
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where Z0 is a P0-Brownian motion modeling the demand from noise traders. Hence the insider’s
strategy in the Kyle-Back equilibrium is given by
X0 =
N∑
n=1
I{v˜=vn}
∫ ·
0
∂yh
0
n(Y
0
r , r)
h0n(Y
0
r , r)
dr.
Proof of Theorem 2.13. As we have seen in Lemma 6.1, Assumption 4.1 is satisfied by each v˜δ. It
then follows from Proposition 5.5 i) and ii) that the distribution of Y δ on [v˜δ = vn] is the same as
the distribution of Zδ conditioned on Zδ1 ∈ [aδn, aδn+1). Denote Y 0,n = Y 0I{v˜=vn} as the cumulative
demand in Kyle Back equilibrium when the fundamental value is vn. The same argument as in [10,
Lemma 5.4] yields
Law(Zδ |Zδ1 ∈ [aδn, aδn+1)) =⇒ Law(Y 0,n), as δ ↓ 0,
for each n ∈ {1, · · · , N}. It then follows
(6.3) Law(Y δ;FI,δ) =⇒ Law(Y 0;FI,0), as δ ↓ 0,
where the filtration FI,0 is F0 initially enlarged by v˜. Recall from (5.1) that Y δ = Zδ+XB,δ−XS,δ,
moreover Y 0 = Z0 + X0. Combining (6.3) with Law(Zδ) =⇒ Law(Z0), we conclude from [14,
Proposition VI.1.23] that Law(XB,δ −XS,δ) =⇒ Law(X0) as δ ↓ 0. 
In the rest of the section, Definition 2.11 iii) is verified for strategies (XB,δ ,XS,δ;FI,δ)δ>0, which
concludes the proof of Theorem 2.12. We have seen in Proposition 4.2 that the expected profit of
the strategy (XB,δ ,XS,δ;FI,δ), constructed in Section 5, satisfies
J δ(vn, 0, 0;XB,δ ,XS,δ) = U δ(vn, 0, 0) − Lδ(vn, 0, 0), n ∈ {1, · · · , N},
where
Lδ(vn, 0, 0) = δβ
δ Eδ,0
[∫ 1
0
(vn − pδ(mδn, r)) I{Y δr−=mδn}dr
∣∣∣∣ v˜δ = vn
]
− δβδ Eδ,0
[∫ 1
0
(vn − pδ(mδn, r)) I{Y δr−=mδn}dr
∣∣∣∣ v˜δ = vn
]
.
(6.4)
This expression for Lδ follows from changing the order size in (4.7) from 1 to δ and utilizing
θB,S,δ(mδn, ·) = θS,S,δ(mδn, ·) = θS,B,δ(mδn, ·) = θB,B,δ(mδn, ·) = 0 from Corollary 5.3 i) and iii),
θB,T,δ = θS,T,δ ≡ 0 from Remark 4.6, and the expectations are taken under Pδ,0. Heremδn := δ⌊(an+
an+1− δ)/2δ⌋ the largest integer multiple of δ smaller than mδn and by mδn := δ⌈(an+an+1− δ)/2δ⌉
the smallest integer multiple of δ larger than mδn. To prove Theorem 2.13, let us first show
(6.5) lim
δ↓0
Lδ(vn, 0, 0) = 0, n ∈ {1, · · · , N}.
In the rest development, we fix vn and denote L
δ = Lδ(vn, 0, 0).
Before presenting technical proofs for (6.5), let us first introduce a heuristic argument. First,
since βδ = 1/(2δ2), (6.4) can be rewritten as
(6.6) Lδ = Eδ,0
[
I
δ,n
1
∣∣∣ v˜δ = vn]− Eδ,0 [Iδ,n1 ∣∣∣ v˜δ = vn] ,
where
I
δ,n
· =
∫ ·
0
(vn − pδ(Y δr− − δ, r)) dLδ,m
δ
n
r , I
δ,n
· =
∫ ·
0
(vn − pδ(Y δr− + δ, r)) dLδ,m
δ
n
r ,
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and Lδ,y· = 12δ
∫ ·
0 I{Y δr−=y}dr is the scaled occupation time of Y
δ at level y. Here Y δ is, in its natural
filtration, the difference of two independent Poisson Y B,δ and Y S,δ with jump size δ and intensity
βδ, cf. Proposition 5.5 ii). For the integrands in I
δ,n
and Iδ,n, we expect that vn− pδ(Y δ· ± δ, ·) L−→
vn − p0(Y 0· , ·), where Y 0 is a P0-Brownian motion. As for the integrators, we will show both Lδ,m
δ
n·
and Lδ,mδn· converge weakly to Lmn· , which is the Brownian local time at level mn := (a0n+ a0n+1)/2.
Then the weak convergence of both integrands and integrators yield
I
δ,n
· and I
δ,n
·
L−→ I0,n· :=
∫ ·
0
(vn − p0(Y 0r , r)) dLmnr , as δ ↓ 0.
Finally passing the previous convergence to conditional expectation, the two terms on the right
hand side of (6.6) cancel each other in the limit.
To make this heuristic argument rigorous, let us first prepare several results.
Proposition 6.2. On the family of filtration (FY,δt )t∈[0,1],δ≥0, generated by (Y δ)δ≥0,
pδ(Y δ· ± δ, ·) L−→ p0(Y 0· , ·) on D[0, 1) as δ ↓ 0.
Proof. To simplify presentation, we will prove
(6.7) pδ(Y δ· , ·) L−→ p0(Y 0· , ·) as δ ↓ 0.
The assertions with ±δ can be proved by replacing Y δ by Y δ ± δ. First, applying Itoˆ’s formula and
utilizing (4.1) yield
pδ(Y δ· , ·) = pδ(0, 0) +
∫ ·
0
1
δ
(
pδ(Y δr− + δ, r)− pδ(Y δr−, r)
)
dY
B,δ
r
+
∫ ·
0
1
δ
(
pδ(Y δr− − δ, r)− pδ(Y δr−, r)
)
dY
S,δ
r ,
(6.8)
where Y
B,δ
· = Y
B,δ
· − δβδ · and Y S,δ· = Y S,δ· − δβδ · are compensated jump processes. For pδ(0, 0) on
the right hand side, the same argument in Lemma 6.1 yields limδ↓0 pδ(0, 0) = p0(0, 0). As for the
other two stochastic integrals, we will show that they converge weakly to
1√
2
∫ ·
0
∂yp
0(Y 0r , r)dW
B
r and −
1√
2
∫ ·
0
∂yp
0(Y 0r , r)dW
S
r , respectively,
where WB and W S are two independent Brownian motion. These estimates then imply the right
hand side of (6.8) converges weakly to
p0(0, 0) +
∫ ·
0
∂yp
0(Y 0r , r) dWr,
where W = WB/
√
2 −W S/√2 is another Brownian motion. Since p0 satisfies ∂tp0 + 12∂2yyp0 = 0,
the previous process has the same law as p0(Y 0· , ·). Therefore (6.7) is confirmed.
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To prove the aforementioned convergence of stochastic integrals, let us first derive the convergence
of (pδ(·+ δ, ·) − pδ(·, ·))/δ on R× [0, 1). To this end, it follows from (2.5) that
1
δ
(pδ(y + δ, t)− pδ(y, t))
=
1
δ
N∑
n=1
vn
[
Pδ,y+δ(Zδ1−t ∈ [aδn, aδn+1))− Pδ,y(Zδ1−t ∈ [aδn, aδn+1))
]
=
1
δ
N∑
n=1
vn
[
Pδ,y(Zδ1−t = a
δ
n − δ) − Pδ,y(Zδ1−t = aδn+1 − δ)
]
=
1
δ
N∑
n=1
vn
[
P1,0
(
Z11−t =
aδn − δ − y
δ
)
− P1,0
(
Z11−t =
aδn+1 − δ − y
δ
)]
=
N∑
n=1
vn

1
δ
e−
1−t
δ2 I∣∣
∣
∣
aδn−δ−y
δ
∣
∣
∣
∣
(
1− t
δ2
)
− 1
δ
e−
1−t
δ2 I∣∣
∣
∣
aδ
n+1
−δ−y
δ
∣
∣
∣
∣
(
1− t
δ2
)
→
N∑
n=1
vn
[
1√
2π(1− t) exp
(
−(a
0
n − y)2
2(1− t)
)
− 1√
2π(1 − t) exp
(
−(a
0
n+1 − y)2
2(1− t)
)]
= ∂yp
0(y, t), as δ ↓ 0.
Here Z11−t is the difference of two independent Poisson random variables with common parameter
(1− t)βδ = (1− t)(2δ2)−1 under P1,0. Hence the fourth identity above follows from the probability
distribution function of the Skellam distribution: P1,0(Z11−t = k) = e
−2µI|k|(2µ), where I|k|(·) is
the modified Bessel function of the second kind and µ = (1 − t)(2δ2)−1, cf. [20]. The convergence
above is locally uniformly in R× [0, 1) according to [1, Theorem 2]. The last identity above follows
from taking y derivative to p0(y, t) =
∑N
n=1
(
Φ
(
a0n+1−y√
1−t
)
− Φ
(
a0n−y√
1−t
))
, cf. (6.1). Combining the
previous locally uniform convergence of (pδ(·+δ, ·)−pδ(·, ·))/δ with the weak convergence Y δ L−→ Y 0
in their natural filtration, we have from [5, Chapter 1, Theorem 5.5]:
1
δ
(
pδ(Y δ· + δ, ·) − pδ(Y δ· , ·)
) L−→ ∂yp0(Y 0· , ·) on D[0, 1) as δ ↓ 0.
As for the integrators in (6.8), Y
B,δ L−→ WB/√2 and Y S,δ L−→ W S/√2. Moreover, both
(Y
B,δ
)δ>0 and (Y
S,δ
)δ>0 are predictable uniform tight (P-UT), since 〈Y B,δ〉t = 〈Y S,δ〉t = t/2,
for any δ > 0, cf. [14, Chapter VI, Theorem 6.13 (iii)]. Then combining weak convergence of both
integrands and integrators, we obtain from [14, Chapter VI, Theorem 6.22] that∫ ·
0
1
δ
(pδ(Y δr− + δ, r)− pδ(Y δr−, r)) dY B,δr L−→
1√
2
∫ ·
0
∂yp
0(Y 0r , r) dW
B
r on D[0, 1) as δ ↓ 0.
A similar weak convergence holds for the other stochastic integral in (6.8) as well. Therefore the
claimed weak convergence of stochastic integrals on the right hand side of (6.8) is confirmed. 
Having studied the weak convergence of integrands in I
δ,n
and Iδ,n, let us switch our attention
to the integrators Lδ,mδn and Lδ,mδn .
Proposition 6.3. On the family of filtration (FY,δt )t∈[0,1],δ≥0, for any n ∈ {1, · · · , N},
Lδ,mδn L−→ Lmn and Lδ,mδn L−→ Lmn on D[0, 1] as δ ↓ 0.
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Proof. For simplicity of presentation, we will prove
(6.9) Lδ,0 L−→ L0 as δ ↓ 0.
Since limδ↓0mδn = limδ↓0mδn = mn follows from (6.2), the statement of the proposition follows from
replacing Y δ by Y δ −mδn (or by Y δ −mδn) and Y 0 by Y 0 −mn in the rest of the proof. To prove
(6.9), applying Itoˆ’s formula to |Y δ· | yields
|Y δ· | =
∑
r≤·
(
|Y δr | − |Y δr−|
)
=
∫ ·
0
(
|Y δr− + δ| − |Y δr−|
)
d(Y B,δr /δ − βδr) +
∫ ·
0
(
|Y δr− − δ| − |Y δr−|
)
d(Y S,δr /δ − βδr)
+
∫ ·
0
(
|Y δr− + δ| + |Y δr− − δ| − 2|Y δr−|
)
βδdr
=
∫ ·
0
(
|Y δr− + δ| − |Y δr−|
)
dY
B,δ
r /δ +
∫ ·
0
(
|Y δr− − δ| − |Y δr−|
)
dY
S,δ
r /δ +
∫ ·
0
1
δ
I{Y δr−=0}dr,
(6.10)
where the third identity follows from |y+ δ|+ |y− δ| − 2|y| = 2δ I{y=0} for any y ∈ R. On the other
hand, Tanaka formula for Brownian motion is
(6.11) |Y 0· | =
∫ ·
0
sgn(Y 0r ) dY
0
r + 2L0· ,
where sgn(x) = 1 when x > 0 or −1 when x ≤ 0.
The convergence (6.9) is then confirmed by comparing both sides of (6.10) and (6.11). To this
end, since Y δ
L−→ Y 0 and the absolute value is a continuous function, then |Y δ| L−→ |Y 0| follows
from [5, Chapter 1, Theorem 5.1]. Then (6.9) is confirmed as soon as we prove the martingale term
on the right hand side of (6.10) converges weakly to the martingale in (6.11), which we prove in
the next result. 
Lemma 6.4. Let M δ :=
∫ ·
0
(|Y δr− + δ| − |Y δr−|) dY B,δr /δ+∫ ·0 (|Y δr− − δ| − |Y δr−|) dY S,δr /δ and M0 :=∫ ·
0 sgn(Y
0
r ) dY
0
r . Then M
δ L−→M0 on D[0, 1] as δ ↓ 0.
Proof. Define f δ(y) := 1δ (|y + δ| − |y|) for y ∈ R and observe
f δ(y) =


1 y ≥ 0
2y/δ + 1 −δ < y < 0
−1 y ≤ −δ
.
It is clear that f δ converges to sgn(·) locally uniformly on R \ {0}. On the other hand, Y δ L−→ Y 0
and the law of Y 0 is continuous. It then follows from [5, Chapter 1, Theorem 5.5] that f δ(Y δ)
L−→
sgn(Y 0). As for the integrators (Y
B,δ
)δ>0, as we have seen in the proof of Proposition 6.2, they
converge weakly to WB/
√
2 and are P-UT. Then [14, Chapter VI, Theorem 6.22] implies∫ ·
0
(
|Y δr− + δ| − |Y δr−|
)
dY
B,δ
r /δ
L−→ 1√
2
∫ ·
0
sgn(Y 0r ) dW
B
r .
Similar argument yields∫ ·
0
(
|Y δr− − δ| − |Y δr−|
)
dY
S,δ
r /δ
L−→ − 1√
2
∫ ·
0
sgn(Y 0r ) dW
S
r .
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Here WB and W S are independent Brownian motion. Defining W =WB/
√
2−W S/√2, we obtain
from the previous two convergence that
M δ
L−→
∫ ·
0
sgn(Y 0r ) dWr which has the same law as M
0.

Propositions 6.2 and 6.3 combined yields the weak convergence of (I
δ,n
)δ>0 and (I
δ,n)δ>0. More-
over the sequence of local time in Proposition 6.3 also converge in expectation.
Corollary 6.5. On the family of filtration (FY,δt )t∈[0,1],δ≥0, for any n ∈ {1, · · · , N},
I
δ,n
and Iδ,n
L−→ I0,n on D[0, 1) as δ ↓ 0.
Proof. The statement follows from combining Propositions 6.2 and 6.3, and appealing to [14, Chap-
ter VI, Theorem 6.22]. In order to apply the previous result, we need to show that both (Lδ,mδn)δ>0
and (Lδ,mδn)δ>0 are P-UT. This property will be verified for (Lδ,mδn)δ>0. The same argument works
for (Lδ,mδn)δ>0 as well. To this end, since Lδ,mδn is a nondecreasing process, (Lδ,mδn)δ>0 is P-UT
as soon as (V ar(Lδ,mδn)1)δ>0 is tight, where V ar(X) is the variation of the process X, cf. [14,
Chapter VI, 6.6]. Note V ar(Lδ,mδn)1 = Lδ,m
δ
n
1 , since Lδ,m
δ
n is nondecreasing. Then the tightness of
(V ar(Lδ,mδn)1)δ>0 is implied by Proposition 6.3. 
Corollary 6.6. For any n ∈ {1, · · · , N} and t ∈ [0, 1],
lim
δ↓0
Eδ,0
[
Lδ,mδnt
]
= lim
δ↓0
Eδ,0
[
Lδ,mδnt
]
= E0,0 [Lmnt ] .
Proof. For simplicity of presentation, we will prove limδ↓0 Eδ,0[Lδ,0t ] = E0,0[L0t ]. Then the statement
of the corollary follows from replacing Y δt by Y
δ
t −mδn or Y δt −mδn in the rest of the proof. Since
the stochastic integrals in (6.10) are Pδ,0-martingales,
2Eδ,0[Lδ,0t ] = Eδ,0[|Y δt |].
Since E[(Y δt )
2] = t for any δ > 0, (|Y δt |;Pδ,0)δ>0 is uniformly integrable. It then follows from
[12, Appendix, Proposition 2.3] and Law(|Y δt |) =⇒ Law(|Y 0t |) that limδ↓0 Eδ,0[|Y δt |] = E0,0[|Y 0t |].
Therefore the claim follows since E0,0[|Y 0t |] = 2E0,0[L0t ] cf. (6.11). 
Collecting previous results, the following result confirms (6.5).
Proposition 6.7. For the strategies (XB,δ ,XS,δ;FI,δ)δ>0 constructed in Section 5,
lim
δ↓0
Lδ(vn, 0, 0) = 0, n ∈ {1, · · · , N}.
Proof. Fix any ǫ ∈ (0, 1). Corollary 6.5 implies that Law(Iδ,n1−ǫ;FY,δ) =⇒ Law(I0,n1−ǫ;F0). Recall
Law(v˜δ) =⇒ Law(v˜) from Lemma 6.1. It then follows
Law
(
I
δ,n
1−ǫ I{v˜δ=vn};FY,δ
)
=⇒ Law
(
I0,n1−ǫ I{v˜=vn};F0
)
.
On the other hand, since N is finite, pδ is bounded uniformly in δ. Then there exists constant
C such that |Iδ,n1−ǫ| I{v˜δ=vn} ≤ CL
δ,mδn
1−ǫ , where the expectation of the upper bound converges, cf.
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Corollary 6.6. Therefore appealing to [12, Appendix Theorem 1.2] and utilizing limδ↓0 Pδ(v˜δ =
vn) = P
0(v˜ = vn) from Lemma 6.1, we obtain
(6.12)
Eδ,0
[
I
δ,n
1−ǫ | v˜δ = vn
]
=
Eδ,0
[
I
δ,n
1−ǫ I{v˜δ=vn}
]
Pδ(v˜δ = vn)
→
E0,0
[
I0,n1−ǫ I{v˜=vn}
]
P0(v˜ = vn)
= E0,0
[
I0,n1−ǫ | v˜ = vn
]
, as δ ↓ 0.
On the other hand, since limδ↓0 Pδ(v˜δ) = P0(v˜ = vn) > 0, there exists a constant C such that
Eδ,0
[
|Iδ,n1 − Iδ,n1−ǫ|
∣∣∣ v˜δ = vn] ≤ C Eδ,0 [Lδ,mδn1 − Lδ,mδn1−ǫ ]→ C E0,0 [Lmn1 − Lmn1−ǫ] , as δ ↓ 0,
where the convergence follows from applying Corollary 6.6 twice. For the difference of Brownian
local time, Le´vy’s result (cf. [15, Chapter 3, Theorem 6.17]) yields
E0,0
[Lmn1 − Lmn1−ǫ] = E0,−mn [L01 − L01−ǫ] = 12E0,−mn
[
sup
r≤1
Y 0r − sup
r≤1−ǫ
Y 0r
]
=
√
2
π
(1−√1− ǫ),
where Y 0 is a P0-Brownian motion and E0,y[supr≤t Y 0r ] =
√
2t/π + y is utilized to obtain the third
identity. Now the previous two estimates combined yield
(6.13) lim sup
δ↓0
Eδ,0
[
|Iδ,n1 − Iδ,n1−ǫ|
∣∣∣ v˜δ = vn] ≤ C(1−√1− ǫ), for another constant C.
Estimates in (6.12) and (6.13) also hold when I
δ,n
is replaced by Iδ,n. These estimates then yield
Eδ,0
[
I
δ,n
1 − Iδ,n1 | v˜δ = vn
]
≤ Eδ,0
[
I
δ,n
1−ǫ − Iδ,n1−ǫ | v˜δ = vn
]
+ Eδ,0
[
|Iδ,n1 − Iδ,n1−ǫ|
∣∣∣ v˜δ = vn]+ Eδ,0 [ |Iδ,n1 − Iδ,n1−ǫ| ∣∣∣ v˜δ = vn] .
Sending δ ↓ 0 in the previous inequality, the first term on the right side vanishes in the limit,
because both conditional expectations converge to the same limit, the limit superior of both second
and third terms are less than C(1−√1− ǫ). Now since ǫ is arbitrarily choose, sending ǫ→ 1 yields
lim supδ↓0 Eδ,0
[
I
δ,n
1 − Iδ,n1 | v˜δ = vn
]
≤ 0. Similar argument leads to lim infδ↓0 Eδ,0
[
I
δ,n
1 − Iδ,n1 | v˜δ = vn
]
≥
0, which concludes the proof. 
Finally the proof of Theorem 2.12 is concluded.
Proof of Theorem 2.12. It remains to verify Definition 2.11 iii). Fix vn and (y, t) = (0, 0) throughout
the proof. We have seen from Proposition 4.4 that V δ ≤ US,δ. On the other hand, Proposition 4.2
yields J (XB,δ ,XS,δ) = U δ − Lδ. Therefore
sup
(XB ,XS) admissible
J δ(XB ,XS)− J δ(XB,δ ,XS,δ) ≤ US,δ − U δ + Lδ.
Since limδ↓0 Lδ = 0 is proved in Proposition 6.7, it suffices to show limδ↓0 US,δ − U δ = 0. To this
end, from the definition of US,δ,
(6.14) US,δ(0, 0) − U δ(0, 0) = (U δ(−δ, 0) − U δ(0, 0)) I{0≤mδn} = δ(vn − p
δ(0, 0))I{0≤mδn}.
The second identity above follows from (4.12) which reads U δ(y, t)−U δ(y−1, t)+δ(vn−pδ(y, t)) = 0
for y ≤ mδn when the order size is δ. Therefore limδ↓0 US,δ−U δ = 0 is confirmed after sending δ ↓ 0
in (6.14). 
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Appendix A. Viscosity solutions
Proposition 3.1 will be proved in this section. To simplify notation, δ = 1 and v˜ = vn are fixed
throughout this section. First let us recall the definition of (discontinuous) viscosity solution to
(2.8). Given a locally bounded function11 v : Z × [0, 1] → R, its upper-semicontinuous envelope v∗
and lower-semicontinuous envelope v∗ are defined as
(A.1) v∗(y, t) := lim sup
t′→t
v(y, t′), v∗(y, t) := lim inf
t′→t
v(y, t′), (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1].
Definition A.1. Let v : Z× [0, 1]→ R be locally bounded.
i) v is a (discontinuous) viscosity subsolution of (2.8) if
−ϕt(y, t)−H(y, t, v∗) ≤ 0,
for all y ∈ Z, t ∈ [0, 1), and any function ϕ : Z × [0, 1] → R continuously differentiable in the
second variable such that (y, t) is a maximum point of v∗ − ϕ.
ii) v is a (discontinuous) viscosity supersolution of (2.8) if
−ϕt(y, t)−H(y, t, v∗) ≥ 0,
for all y ∈ Z, t ∈ [0, 1), and any function ϕ : Z × [0, 1] → R continuously differentiable in the
second variable such that (y, t) is a minimum point of v∗ − ϕ.
iii) We say that v is a (discontinuous) viscosity solution of (2.8) if it is both subsolution and
supersolution.
For the insider’s optimization problem, let us recall the dynamic programming principle (cf. e.g.
[19, Remark 3.3.3]). Given an admissible strategy (XB ,XS), any [t, 1]−valued stopping time τ ,
and the fundamental value vn, denote the associated profit by
Int,τ :=
∫ τ
t
(vn − p(Yr− + 1, r))dXB,Br +
∫ τ
t
(vn − p(Yr− + 2, r))dXB,Tr +
∫ τ
t
(vn − p(Yr−, r))dXB,Sr
−
∫ τ
t
(vn − p(Yr− − 1, r))dXS,Sr −
∫ τ
t
(vn − p(Yr− − 2, r))dXS,Tr −
∫ τ
t
(vn − p(Yr−, r))dXS,Br ,
where Y = Z +XB −XS . Then the dynamic programming principle reads:
DPP i) For any admissible strategy (XB ,XS) and any [t, 1]-valued stopping time τ ,
V (y, t) ≥ Ey,t[V (τ, Yτ ) + Int,τ ].
DPP ii) For any ǫ > 0, there exists an admissible strategy (XB ,XS) such that for all [t, 1]-valued
stopping time τ ,
V (y, t)− ǫ ≤ Ey,t[V (τ, Yτ ) + Int,τ ].
The viscosity solution property of the value function V follows from the dynamic program-
ming principle and standard arguments in viscosity solutions, (see e.g. [19, Propositions 4.3.1 and
4.3.2]12.) Therefore Proposition 3.1 i) is verified.
11Since the state space Z is discrete, v is locally bounded if v(y, ·) is bounded in any bounded neighborhood of t
and any fixed y ∈ Z.
12Therein the stopping time τm can be chosen as the first jump time of Y where Ytm = y for a sequence (tm)m → t
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Remark A.2. The proof of DPP ii) utilizes the measurable selection theorem. To avoid this tech-
nical result, one could employ the weak dynamic programming principle in [6]. For the insider’s
optimization problem, the weak dynamic programming principle reads:
WDPP i) For any [t, 1]-valued stopping time τ ,
V (y, t) ≤ sup
(XB ,XS)
Ey,t
[
V ∗(τ, Yτ ) + Int,τ
]
.
WDPP ii) For any [t, 1]-valued stopping time τ and any upper-semicontinuous function ϕ on Z× [0, 1]
such that V ≥ ϕ, then
V (y, t) ≥ sup
(XB ,XS)
Ey,t
[
ϕ(τ, Yτ ) + Int,τ
]
.
Conditions A1, A2, and A3 from Assumption A in [6] are clearly satisfied in the current context.
Condition A4 from Assumption A can be verified following the same argument in [6, Proposition 5.4].
Therefore aforementioned weak dynamic programming principle holds. Hence the value function is
a viscosity solution to (2.8) following from arguments similar to [6, Section 5.2].
Now the proof of Proposition 3.1 ii) is presented. To prove (vn, y, t, V ) ∈ dom(H), observe from
the viscosity supersolution property of V that H(vn, y, t, V∗) < ∞, hence (vn, y, t, V∗) ∈ dom(H).
On the other hand, for any integrable intensities θi,j, i ∈ {B,S} and j ∈ {B,T, S}, due to Def-
inition 2.2 iv), one can show Ey,t[Int,1] is a continuous function in t. As a supremum of a family
of continuous function (cf. (2.7)), V is then lower-semicontinuous in t. Therefore V∗ ≡ V , which
implies (vn, y, t, V ) ∈ dom(H) for any vn, (y, t) ∈ Z × [0, 1). It then follows from (3.1) and (3.2)
that
(A.2) V (y−1, t)+p(y−1, t)−vn ≤ V (y, t) ≤ V (y−1, t)+p(y, t)−vn, for any (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1).
Taking limit supremum in t in the previous inequalities and utilizing the continuity of t 7→ p(y, t), it
follows that the previous inequalities still hold when V is replaced by V ∗, which means (vn, y, t, V ∗) ∈
dom(H) for any vn, (y, t) ∈ Z×[0, 1). As a result, H(vn, y, t, V∗) andH(vn, y, t, V ∗) have the reduced
form (3.3) where V is replaced by V∗ and V ∗, respectively. Hence Definition A.1 implies that V is
a viscosity solution of (3.4).
To prove Proposition 3.1 iii) and iv), let us first derive a comparison result for (3.4). The function
v : Z × [0, 1] → R has at most polynomial growth in its first variable if there exist C and n such
that |v(y, t)| ≤ C(1 + |y|n), for any (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1].
Lemma A.3. Assume that u (resp. v) has at most polynomial growth and that it is upper-
semicontinuous viscosity subsolution (resp. lower-semicontinuous supersolution) to (3.4). If u(·, 1) ≤
v(·, 1), then u ≤ v in Z× [0, 1).
Assume this comparison result for a moment. Inequalities (A.2) and Assumption 2.5 combined
imply that V is of at most polynomial growth. Then Lemma A.3 and (A.1) combined yield V∗ ≤
V ∗ ≤ V∗, which implies the continuity of t 7→ V (y, t), hence Proposition 3.1 iii) is verified. On the
other hand, one can prove V˜ (y, t) := Ey,t [V (Z1, 1)] is of at most polynomial growth and is another
viscosity solution to (3.4)13. Then Lemma A.3 yields
V (y, t) = V˜ (y, t) = Ey,t [V (Z1, 1)] ,
13Write V˜ (y, t) = E0 [V (Z1−t + y, 1)]. One can utilize the Markov property of Z to show that V˜ is continuous
differentiable and V˜ is a classical solution to (3.4).
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which confirms Proposition 3.1 iv) via the Markov property of Z.
Proof of Lemma A.3. For λ > 0, define u˜ = eλtu and v˜ = eλtv. One can check u˜ (resp. v˜) is a
viscosity subsolution (resp. supersolution) to
(A.3) −wt + λw − (w(y + 1, t)− 2w(y, t) + w(y − 1, t)) β = 0.
Since the comparison result for (A.3) implies the comparison result for (2.8), it suffices to consider
u (resp. v) as the viscosity subsolution (resp. supersolution) of (A.3).
Let C and n be constants such that |u|, |v| ≤ C(1 + |y|n) on Z × [0, 1]. Consider ψ(y, t) =
e−αt(y2n + C˜) for some constants α and C˜. It follows
−ψt + λψ + (ψ(y + 1, t)− 2ψ(y, t) + ψ(y − 1, t)) β > e−αt
(
(α+ λ)(y2n + C˜)− 2βy2n
)
> 0,
when α + λ > 2β. Choosing α satisfying the previous inequality, then v + ξψ, for any ξ > 0, is
a viscosity supersolution to (A.3). Once we show u ≤ v + ξψ, the statement of the lemma then
follows after sending ξ ↓ 0.
Since both u and v have at most linear growth
(A.4) lim
|y|→∞
(u− v − ξψ)(y, t) = −∞.
Replacing v by v+ξψ, we can assume that u (resp. v) is a viscosity subsolution (resp. supersolution)
to (A.3) and
sup
Z×[0,1]
(u− v) = sup
O×[0,1]
(u− v), for some compact set O ⊂ Z.
Then u ≤ v follows from the standard argument in viscosity solutions (cf. e.g. [19, Theorem 4.4.4]),
which we briefly recall below.
Assume M := supZ×[0,1](u− v) = supO×[0,1](u− v) > 0 and the maximum is attained at (x, t) ∈
O × [0, 1]. For any ǫ > 0, define
Φǫ(x, y, t, s) := u(x, t)− v(y, s)− φǫ(x, y, t, s), where φǫ(x, y, t, s) := 1
ǫ
[|x− y|2 + |t− s|2].
The upper-semicontinuous function Φǫ attains its maximum, denoted by Mǫ, at (xǫ, yǫ, tǫ, sǫ). One
can show, using the same argument as in [19, Theorem 4.4.4],
Mǫ →M and (xǫ, yǫ, tǫ, sǫ)→ (x, x, t, t) ∈ O2 × [0, 1]2 as ǫ ↓ 0.
Here (xǫ, yǫ, tǫ, sǫ) ∈ O2 × [0, 1]2 for sufficiently small ǫ. Now observe that
• (xǫ, tǫ) is a local maximum of (x, t) 7→ u(x, t)− φǫ(x, yǫ, t, sǫ);
• (yǫ, sǫ) is a local minimum of (y, t) 7→ v(y, s) + φǫ(xǫ, y, tǫ, s).
Then the viscosity subsolution property of u and the supersolution property of v imply, respectively,
− 2
ǫ
(tǫ − sǫ) + λu(xǫ, tǫ)− (u(xǫ + 1, tǫ)− 2u(xǫ, tǫ) + u(xǫ, tǫ)) β ≤ 0,
− 2
ǫ
(tǫ − sǫ) + λv(yǫ, sǫ)− (u(yǫ + 1, sǫ)− 2v(yǫ, sǫ) + v(yǫ, sǫ)) β ≥ 0.
Taking difference of the previous inequalities yields
(λ+ 2β)(u(xǫ, tǫ)− v(yǫ, sǫ)) ≤ β (u(xǫ + 1, tǫ) + u(xǫ − 1, tǫ))− β (v(yǫ + 1, sǫ) + v(yǫ − 1, sǫ)) .
Sending ǫ ↓ 0 on both sides, we obtain
(λ+ 2β)M = (λ+ 2β)u(x, t) ≤ β (u(x+ 1, t)− v(x+ 1, t))+ β (u(x− 1, t)− v(x− 1, t)) ≤ 2βM,
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which contradicts with λM > 0.

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